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The electrification of the transportation sector through the diffusion of plug-in
electric vehicles (EVs), coupled with cleaner electricity generation, is consid-
ered a promising pathway to reduce air pollution from on-road vehicles and
to strengthen energy security. The annual new EV sales increased 8-fold since
2011. However, the market share of EVs is still less than 1% in the new ve-
hicle market. One of the significant barriers to large-scale adoption of EVs is
the charging facilities. Well developed EV charging services are essential for
the successful launch of electric vehicles and provide valuable vehicle-to-grid
(V2G) services to the smart grid. On the other hand, unplanned charging brings
instability, inefficiency and higher cost to the power grid and hinders the rise of
clean transportation.
This work focuses on the EV charging, including the methodology, develop-
ment, and economy. In different contexts, the technologies of EV charging are
presented. Both online and off-line approaches are discussed, in decentralized
and centralized scenarios. The interaction between the EVs and the power grid
is studied, in particular for the V2G services including load shifting, frequency
regulation and spinning reserves. The indirect network effect between EVs and
EV charging are illustrated. A stylized model for both the EV consumers and
the charging facility investor is developed, including the EV price, the coverage
of the charging stations, and the price of charging.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Electric Vehicle history
The first electric car is considered to be invented by Scotsman Robert Ander-
son, somewhere in-between 1832 and 1839. Unfortunately, the exact date is un-
known and the detail design was lost. In the same time, Sibrandus Stratingh, a
Dutch chemistry professor, also carried out a breakthrough in inventing electric
horseless carriages.
Figure 1.1: First Electric horseless Carriage, by Sibrandus Stratingh. It
was simply a wooden platform carrying a battery and a motor.
Now it is on display at the Museum Boerhaave in Netherlands.
The first electric carriages were nothing but some fancy oddity, due to the
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backward battery technology. The carriage weighted about 6.6 lb and could
carry loads of half of its own weight. It was powered by a primeval battery
consisting a zinc plate and a copper plate sitting in a jar filled with dilute acid.
The battery could provide fifteen minutes driving time before the current was
exhausted.
Thanks to the invention of lead-acid rechargeable battery in 1859, the electric
vehicles (EVs) became more practical. In 1881, the first electric vehicle powered
by rechargeable batteries was demonstrated at the International Exhibition of
Electricity in Paris. Using the updated battery technology, the electric vehicle
reached a top speed up to around 10 miles per hour and the range of driving
was extended to around 25 miles at the dawn of the 20th century.
At that time, the major rivals of the electric vehicles were the traditional
horse carriages and the cars powered by steam or internal combustion engines
(ICEs). Although the horse-drawn carriages were more dependable and stur-
dy, the accumulation of horse manure was a serious problem of towns. For a
steam power car, the driver needed a long time to light up the loco and build
the pressure, comparing to which, charging EV overnight became a minor in-
convenience. The gasoline internal combustion engine vehicles, at its birth in
1985, also had it defects including difficult to start, and the need of a complex
gearbox which is hard to maintain. On the other hand, electric cars has no e-
missions nor noise, drives easily and smoothly, and lower cost of upkeep. The
limited range of electric cars did not seem to be a great issue since the journey of
early mobiles took place in built-up areas, which were limited in 19th century.
In the golden time of electric vehicles from 1900 to 1910, the market share of
EVs in the United States achieved almost 40%, comparing to 22% market share
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of gasoline cars [16]. EVs were running elegantly without noise and pollutants,
and became popular with wealthy people. Even the Royalty became a fan and
enjoyed the driving. Other urban residents could experience it by taking an
electric cab, which had been proved a great success in America. Facing the
high demand of electric cars, the manufacturers were working on the biggest
drawback of the electric vehicles, the limited range. By 1903, Thomas Edison
created a nickel-iron battery for transport applications. The new battery could
supply energy for EVs to travel over 45 miles. In the same time, Ferdinand
Porsche, the founder of the Porsche, created the first hybrid vehicle, the Semper
vivus. The vehicle was powered by a battery and two combustion engines and
the maximum speed reached 25 miles per hour.
Figure 1.2: Queen Alexandra’s electric car for driving around the grounds
of Sandringham House.
However, gasoline vehicles went from strength to strength and turned a-
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gainst electrics. The Kettering electric starter made the internal combustion ve-
hicle as convenient as EVs. Henry Ford and his model T made gasoline cars
widely available and affordable. The wide driving range and the cheap price
made half of all the cars in the US to be model T by 1918. Meanwhile, better
roads and new discovered crude oil reserves helped contribute to the disappear-
ing of EVs in 1935. Over the next 30 years or so, cheap abundant gasoline and
continued improvement in the internal combustion engine created little need
for alternative fuel vehicles. In 1960s and 1970s, the soaring gas price brought
EVs back into the public consciousness temporarily. Sebring Vanguard’s CitiCar
was one successful example. The wedge-shaped compact car with 50-60 miles
driving range made the company the sixth largest U.S. auto maker by 1975. But
the limited performance and driving range caused interest in EVs to fade again.
In the 1990s, new federal and state regulations created a renewed interest
in EVs. Automakers began modifying popular vehicle models into electric ve-
hicles while improving the performance and range. In 2000, Toyota released
the Prius, the first mass-produced hybrid vehicle, worldwide. It became an in-
stant success. The sale of Prius in 2015 achieved 18,000. In 2006, Tesla Motors
announced plans of building a luxury electric sports car with a range of 200+
miles. Now three production lines of EVs are available, with a driving range
more than 250 miles. In 2010, GM released the Chevy Volt with battery tech-
nology developed by the Department of Energy (DoE). In the same year, Nissan
released the LEAF, the most popular EV model on the road by 2016.
There are typically three types of electric vehicles, plug-in EVs (PEVs), hy-
brid EVs and plug-in hybrid EVs (PHEVs). In a plug-in EV, the electric motor
is powered by battery packs which are rechargeable by any external source of
4
Figure 1.3: Tesla model S: powered by a battery pack with capacity 85 k-
Wh, driving range 265 miles, 0 to 60 mph in 2.5 seconds.
electricity, such as wall sockets. A hybrid electric vehicle, however, combines
internal combustion engines with the electric motor. The ICE is used to charge
the battery when the capacity is low or directly delivers power to the wheels
when it is needed. Specially, a plug-in hybrid EV (PHEVs) combines the advan-
tages of both EVs, which has internal combustion engine and a battery that can
be charged by plugging into the electrical grid.
As of December 2014, the global number of EVs reached over 665,000, which
represents 0.08% of total passenger cars. In 2015, total electric drive vehicle sales
reaches over 498,000, which is 2.87% of total annual vehicle sales [39]. Norway,
Netherlands, Sweden and the US are counturies with most EV adoption. In
particular, the market sales shares of EVs reaches over 12% in Norway [68].
The accumulation in EV market also stimulates the investment in EV charg-
ing facilities. Through the end of 2014, there were more than 15,000 fast charging
5
Figure 1.4: Nissan leaf: the most popular EV model by 2016. Powered by
a Li-ion battery pack with capacity 24 kWh, driving range 107
miles.
points and 94,000 slow charging points across the world. EV charging station
stock more than doubled for slow charging points between the end of 2012 and
2014, and increased eightfold for fast charging points [68]. As of March 2016,
there are more than 12,700 electric stations and 31,800 charging outlets deployed
in the United States, most are installed in the east and west coast [140].
Despite significant growth, current EV adoption is well below President
Obama’s call to have 1 million EVs on the road by 2015. Over the long term,
however, EVs will likely need to account for a significant share of the vehicle
fleet in order for auto makers to achieve the new Corporate Average Fuel Econ-
omy standards of 54.5 mpg by 2025, up from current level of 27.5 mpg [1].
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1.2 Importance of EV charging.
The anxiety of driving range has been the greatest barrier of wide EV adoption.
Thus the convenient access of charging facilities and fast charging technology
are essential for success of EVs. Residential are unlikely to purchase EVs until
there are sufficient charging facilities on the road. On the other hand, commer-
cial investor will build charging facilities only when there are enough charging
demand, i.e., EVs on the road. In this case, both consumers and investors are
waiting for the movement of each other. Studies indicate that a positive feed-
back exists during the initial adoption stage when EV sales and EV charging ser-
vices exceed a certain threshold; the market share of both EVs and EV charging
services will likely grow at a substantially higher rate henceforth [151, 152]. This
result justifies that the government needs to spend efforts to establish charging
facility network at the launch time of EVs.
The United States, by 2016, has built about 12,700 charging stations with
about 31,800 charging outlets, thanks to the direct and indirect investments of
federal and local governments. For example, the Department of Energy (DoE)
provided $230 million dollars from 2013 to establish 13,000 charging stations.
There are also private initiatives in establishing networks of charging facilities.
For example, PG&E announced in 2015 a plan to install 25,000 charging sta-
tions. Kroger, the largest grocery store owner of the U.S. has installed over 300
charging stations in key markets over the country [56]. Walmart and Kohl’s also
expanded their charging stations [54, 55].
Sufficient development of EV charging not only helps the successful launch
of electric vehicles, but also is believed as a promising solution to the pollution
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and an essential component of the future smart grid.
The growth in energy demand and greenhouse gas emissions is mainly due
to car ownership and economic development [62]. In 2014, 26% of the total
greenhouse gas emissions in the USA came from the transportation, which have
increased by 17% since 1990 [3]. The majority of greenhouse gas emission from
transportation are CO2 emissions, which is due to the combustion of fossil en-
ergy in vehicles. The prevailing conjecture is that the electrified transportation
with “clean” power generators such as wind turbines or solar panels is an ef-
ficient way to reduce this emission. The well managed charging of EV can be
helpful to improve the shape of the overall demand, allow the power utilities to
operate more efficiently, and maximally make use of the renewable energy. For
example, the peak output of wind generators usually happens in the evening
when the load is low. Without EVs, the output of wind generators is limited
to maintain the stability of the system. However, large scale adoption of EVs
makes it possible to fully use the wind energy to charge EVs during the night
without any emission. In [44], it has been shown that, EV charging during the
off-peak period will contribute to the adoption of renewable energy and largely
reduce the emission of CO2 .
Besides the environmental benefits, the adoption of EVs can also provide po-
tential services back to the power grid [80]. Vehicle to grid (V2G) services typ-
ically include spinning reserves, frequency regulation and peak power supply.
Spinning reserves and frequency regulations are referred as ancillary services,
which account for up to 10% of electricity cost, or about $12 billion per year in
the U.S. [65].
Spinning reserves refer to additional generating capacity that can quickly
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response to the requirements of the independent system operator (ISO), typ-
ically within 10 minutes. When there is an unplanned event, such as loss of
generation, the spinning reserve providers are required to supply power back
to the grid. Spinning reserves are paid for by the amount of time the service
providers are available. Traditionally, it requires generators to be “spinning”
at low or partial speed so that they can act upon the request. For the charg-
ing services, however, this only requires having EVs plugged in to the system.
When the spinning reserve is required, the EV charging station stops charging
EVs or discharges the battery to power the system or simply . The requirements
of spinning reserves are called occasionally, limited by the contract to 20 calls
per year and 1 hour per call at maximum [82], which requires small amount of
energy and makes it suitable for EV charging to participate in.
Frequency regulation accounts for over 80% of the cost of ancillary services.
ISOs monitor the load, generation balance, and the frequency deviation of the
grid and send out signals to service providers to follow. For example, when the
power load is less than the generation and the frequency of the grid increases,
ISOs will ask the charging stations, who participate in the regulation market,
to consume more power. When the generation is less than the demand, ISO
will ask the participants to consume less. The calls for regulation happen more
frequently than those to spinning reserve (400 time a day) and require much
faster response (less than one minute). The payment is measured based on how
fast the response is and how well the demand of the charging station tracks the
regulation signal sent by ISO. The frequency regulation market is also suitable
for EV charging to participant in. The action of EV charging station is agile due
to the fast response of batteries.
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The peak power market is established to deal with times of high power con-
sumption, e.g., hot summer afternoons. Since the peak power time during one
year lasts about a few hundred hours, it is economic to use some generators with
small capacity cost, even with higher marginal cost, such as gas turbines. For
EV charging stations, charging EVs during off peak hours and selling energy
back to the grid during the peak hour may increase profit.
Given the possibility of the V2G service of EVs, social planners have more
motivation to help the successful launch of EVs. Simply by allowing the EV
charging stations to participate in the ancillary service and peak power market-
s, the social planner will help the grid to be cleaner, more reliable, and more
efficient. Meanwhile, the option to participate in the power market may attract
more investment in charging facilities. The charging cost would be lower not
only due to the competition between charging stations, but also due to the extra
income from the V2G services. The EV consumers enjoy the cheaper operation
cost of EVs and other consumers have cleaner energy. Everyone wins.
1.3 Overview of technology: challenges and limitations.
Impacts and challenges
However, before the win-win situation comes true, multiple technical chal-
lenges need to be solved. It has been shown that, with no proper management,
the large scale charging of EVs can impact demand peaks, reduce reserve mar-
gins, and increase prices. It may also lead to negative consequences on voltage
control, power quality (harmonics and subharmonics), phase balance and relay
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protection [119, 106, 103, 29, 22].
The operation of EVs in a distribution system will be a challenging demand
side management problem from the utilities’ perspective since EV battery charg-
ers represent sizeable loads. Numerous EV owners tend to arrive home from
work within a narrow time period and immediately plug-in their vehicle to a
charger during a time of already high peak demand. These un-managed charg-
ing activities could significantly change the load profile of the grid, increase sys-
tem losses, cause inefficient dispatch, increase the real-time localized marginal
price, and draw down the voltage level. Studies showed the increase in peak
load can be as large as 80% and the drop of the voltage level can be more than
14% [22, 29]. According to the study of Oak Ridge National Laboratory, ad-
ditional generation capacity is needed to satisfy the added demand when EV
charging in the evening in most regions [59]. The authors of [127] show that
uncontrolled EV charging may reshape the demand load and create new peak
periods. The intensified peak load reduces the spinning margin and makes the
system less reliable.
Second, the EV charging introduces extra demand burden to the transform-
ers in the distribution network. A commonly used 25kVA neighborhood trans-
former serves the load of typically 5-7 households. The level 1 charger accounts
for around 1/3 load of a household and the level 2 charger accounts for around
1 more household load. The load during the peak period may cause the trans-
former to be overloaded, which can decrease a transformer’s expected lifespan
by 20% [29, 120].
On the other hand, EV chargers draw AC power and convert it to DC, which
produces harmonic distortion in the distribution system. The distortion in volt-
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age and harmonics in current in distribution networks cause all kinds of prob-
lems, including excessive neutral current and transformer hot spots [104]. The
harmonic distortion of different models of batteries varies. However, the im-
pact of EV charging is additive. The charging processes of all EV chargers start
at typically the same time in order to use the cheapest energy during the off-
peak hour. Massive EV charging will not only affect the magnitude but also the
phase angles of individual harmonic components [52].
Besides the negative impact on the grid, there are several commonly-cited
barriers to EV and EVCS adoption. First, EVs are more expensive than their
conventional gasoline vehicle counterparts. The manufacturer’s suggested re-
tail prices (MSRP) for the 2016 model of Nissan Leaf and Chevrolet Volt are
$32,450 and $33,170, respectively, while the average price for a comparable con-
ventional vehicle (e.g., Nissan Sentra, Chevrolet Cruze, Ford Focus and Honda
Civic) is between $16,000 and $18,000. A major reason behind the cost differ-
ential is the cost of the EV battery. As battery technology improves, the cost
should come down. In addition, lower operating costs of EVs can significantly
offset the high initial purchase costs. A study by EPRI in 2013 compares the life-
time costs (including purchase cost less incentives, maintenance, and operation)
of vehicles of different fuel types and finds that under reasonable assumption-
s, higher capital costs are well balanced by savings in operation costs: EVs are
typically within 10% of comparable hybrid and conventional gasoline vehicles
[27].
The second notable barrier to EV adoption is the limited driving range. Plug-
in electric vehicles have a shorter range per charge than conventional vehicles
have per tank of gas, contributing to consumer anxiety of running out of elec-
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tricity before reaching a charging station. The Nissan LEAF, the most popular
battery electric vehicle in the U.S. has an EPA-rated range of 84 miles on a fully
charged battery in 2016. The Chevrolet Volt has an all-electric range of 53 miles,
beyond which it will operate under gasoline mode. This range is sufficient for
daily household trips but may not be enough for longer distance travel.
The third barrier, closely related to the second, is the lack of charging in-
frastructure. By 2016, there are 12,700 charging stations in the U.S., comparing
to 121,446 gas stations [137]. A large network of charging stations can reduce
range anxiety and allow PHEVs to operate more under the all-electric mode to
save gasoline. The installation of charging stations involves a variety of cost in-
cluding charging station hardware, other materials, labor and permits. A public
Level 2 charging station has 3-4 charging units and costs about $15,000 while
a DC fast charging station costs over $50,000. These charging stations can be
found at workplace parking lots, shopping centers, grocery stores, restaurants,
vehicle dealers and existing gasoline stations. Owners of charging stations are
often motivated by a variety of considerations such as boosting their sustain-
ability credentials, attracting customers for their main business, and providing
a service for employees. Charging stations are often managed by one of the
major national operators such as Blink, ChargePoint, and eVgo.
The fourth barrier is long charging times. It takes much longer to charge
EVs than to fill up gasoline vehicles. An EV may not be able to get fully charged
overnight if it uses a regular 110 Volt electric plug (e.g., it takes 21 hours for a
Nissan LEAF to get fully charged) . To get faster charging, EV drivers either
need to install a charging station at home or go to public charging stations. It
takes 6-8 hours to fully charge a Nissan Leaf at a Level 2 charging station and
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only 10-30 minutes at a DC fast charging station. Unlike battery EVs, PHEV
batteries can be charged not only by an outside electric power source, but by
their own internal combustion engine as well. Having the second source of
power in hybrid electric vehicles may alleviate range anxiety but the shorter
electric range limits the fuel cost savings from EVs.
1.4 Broad classifications of EV charging methodologies
The great challenge and potential of EV charing problems have attracted plenty
of attention to this area. The subject can be probed from different angles. An
EV owner wants to minimize the total charging cost with respect to dynamic
electricity prices [60]. The objective of a aggregator or a charging station op-
erator is to maximize the total charging profit, facing stochastic EV arrivals,
random charging demands, dynamic electricity prices, fluctuating ancillary ser-
vice requirements and other system constraints [18, 132, 141, 73, 153, 148]. The
distribution network operator is concerned about the stability and reliability of
the grid and manages the charging of EV taking into account voltage deviation,
efficient dispatch, demand deviation, system losses etc. [97, 145, 77, 47, 33].
EV charge scheduling policies can be classified into two categories, stat-
ic(offline) and dynamic(online) algorithms, by the information available. Static
scheduling algorithms require all information about EVs and the power system
within the scheduling horizons, e.g., the charging demand, arrival and depar-
ture time of all EVs, electricity price and so on. Dynamic scheduling algorithms
only know the information about the power system up to the time the schedul-
ing is made and the states of the EVs that have already arrived at the station.
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Instead of knowing the future electricity price and charging requirement of EVs,
dynamic scheduling algorithms may assume that statistics of this information
is available, such as the distribution of the EV arrivals. From the perspective of
aggregators or a charging station operator, the centralized control problem may
be reasonable. That is, the scheduler has direct access to control the charging
of multiple EVs in the charging station. The scheduler can determine when to
activate or deactivate the chargers and control the charging rate of each individ-
ual EV. As an independent system operator (ISO), it may be more reasonable to
consider the decentralized framework. The ISO does not have direct control on
the charging of each individual EV. Instead, it can affect the charging behavior
of EVs via adjusting the charging price or broadcasting similar signals. The in-
dividual EV owner and charging station operator would respond to the signal
by modifying their charging profiles.
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CHAPTER 2
EV CHARGING MODELS AND ENERGY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
In this chapter, we will present frameworks for EV charging in different con-
texts. We first review the charging technology and behavior of EV batteries in
Section 2.1 and 2.2. Then the EV charging frameworks in different levels are
presented, including charging at home, in a distribution system, and in a public
charging station. In the end, the interaction between the EV charging and the
grid is presented in a vehicle-to-grid framework.
2.1 Charging Standards
There are typically three levels of charging stations: Level 1, Level 2 and DC Fast
Charge (DCFC) [34] 1. These levels denote different charging rates of an electric
vehicle’s battery. The use of higher level charging stations will dramatically
reduce charging time, but the building cost is also significantly higher. The
characteristics of three charging levels are summarized as follows.
Table 2.1: EV charging classification
Charging time Voltage/Current Cost Availability
Level 1 Up to 20 hours 110V/15A Residential
Level 2 Up to 7 hours 240V/40A $2000-$15000 Residential/Public
DC 30 minutes 480V/125A $50,000-$100,000 Public
Level 1 charging is the most common form of battery recharging to satisfy all
1Level 1, 2, and DCFC are the most widely deployed classes of chargers. For the information
of other classes, the information can be found at: http://standards.sae.org/j2836/2 201109/
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of a driver’s need. It provides charging from a standard residential 110 volt AC
outlet. Most electric vehicle manufacturers include a Level 1 cord set so that no
additional installation is required. On one end of the cord is a standard NEMA
connector (for example, a NEMA 5-15, which is a common three-prong house-
hold plug) and on the other end is an SAE J1772 standard connector. The SAE
J1772 connector plugs into the car’s J1772 charge port and the NEMA connector
plugs into a standard NEMA wall outlet. The power consumption is approxi-
mately equal to that of a toaster, leading to about 4 miles of range per hour of
charging. Overnight charging at 110V can replenish about 40 miles of driving
range. However, a completely depleted battery could take up to 20-22 hours to
completely recharge.
Figure 2.1: Level 1 charger
Level 2 equipment uses the same connector and charging port as level 1.
However, level 2 equipment needs a dedicated electrical circuit to improve safe-
ty thus requiring professional electrical installation. The charging station can be
installed in either residential houses or in public charging stations. The cost of
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installing a single port in a residential house is a little bit more than $1000, over
half of which is the hard ware cost [72]. The cost of installing a level 2 charg-
ing station in public stations varies from $2,000 to $15,000 with the number of
ports, station features and brands. The power consumption of Level 2 charging
is like a clothes dryer in the house. It will supply up to approximately 15 miles
of travel for one hour of charging to vehicles with a 3.3kW onboard charger, or
30 miles of travel for one hour of charging for vehicles with a 6.6kW onboard
charger. To fully charge an EV, it would take around 7 hours. Now, level 2 is the
dominating class of public charging stations.
DC fast charging requires commercial grade 480V AC power circuits whose
power consumption equals approximately 15 average size residential central
air conditioning units. So it is only available in public charging stations. DCFC
transforms the AC power to DC and supplies up to 40 miles of driving range
for every 10 minutes of charging, or a full recharge in 30 minutes. Among the
DCFCs deployed in the USA, there are three types of DC fast charging systems:
SAE J1772 Combo used by Chevrolet and BMW, CHAdeMO used by Nissan,
Mitsubishi, Toyota, and Fuji, and Tesla’s supercharger. The cost of a DC charg-
ing station is between $50,000 to $100,000 due to the expensive hardware and
the frequent need to install a new 480V transformer.
2.2 Charging behavior of an EV battery
To study the EV charging behavior or design the battery management system,
we need to understand how the batteries of EVs are charged and discharged.
There are four kinds of batteries that are commonly used in electric vehicles,
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Figure 2.2: Level 2 charger
Lead-Acid, Li-Ion, NiMH and Ni Cd [139]. The typical discharging behavior
curve of a battery is presented in Figure 2.4. The terminal voltage of the battery
versus the state of charge (SOC) shows nonlinear behavior. When the battery
capacity is almost full, the voltage drops quickly to a steady level as the battery
discharges. Then the battery enters a linear range. When the capacity is as
low as 20%, the battery enters the other nonlinear zone, in which the terminal
voltage drops exponentially.
The modeling of battery has been studied extensively. The most important
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Figure 2.3: DC charger
Figure 2.4: Discharge curve
articles in the field date back to 1960s. Shepherd first proposed an equation
description of battery discharge and the method to fit the parameters [129]. If all
factors except polarization is ignored, then the battery voltage Vbatt is defined
as
Vbatt = E0 − K
Q
Q − it i
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where Vbatt is the battery voltage, E0 the battery constant voltage, K the polar-
ization resistance, Q the battery capacity, i is the battery current, and it =
∫
idt
the actual battery charge (state of charging). To include the internal resistance,
the voltage equation becomes
Vbatt = E0 − K
Q
Q − it i − R × i
where R is the internal resistance.
The above formula can describe the linear zone well. However, the initial
drop at the beginning of a battery discharge is not included. Thus an extra
exponential term A exp(−B × it) is added to correct for the difference, where A
and B are empirical constants. The final equation is as follows.
Vbatt = E0 − K
Q
Q − it i − R × i + A exp(−B × it).
Tremblay & Dessaint extend Shepherd’s model and propose detailed models
for four different kinds of batteries taking into account the open circuit voltage
as a function of SOC [139]. The models are summarized as follows.
• Lead-Acid
Discharge: Vbatt = E0 − R × i − K QQ−it (it + i∗) + Exp(t)
Charge: Vbatt = E0 − R × i − K Qit−0.1Q i∗ − K QQ−it it + Exp(t)
where Vbatt is the battery voltage, E0 the battery constant voltage, K the
polarization resistance, Q the battery capacity, it =
∫
idt actual battery
charge (state of charging), i battery current, i∗ filtered current, and Exp(t)
satisfies
dExp(t)/dt = B|i(t)|[−Exp(t) + Au(t)],
where u(t) is the charge and discharge mode. u(t) = 1 is the charge mode
and u(t) = 0 is the discharge mode.
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• Li-Ion
Discharge: Vbatt = E0 − R × i − K QQ−it (it + i∗) + A exp(−B × it)
Charge: Vbatt = E0 − R × i − K Qit−0.1Q i∗ − K QQ−it it + A exp(−B × it)
• NiMH and NiCd
Discharge: Vbatt = E0 − R × i − K QQ−it (it + i∗) + Exp(t)
Charge: Vbatt = E0 − R × i − K Q|it|−0.1Q i∗ − K QQ−it it + Exp(t)
These battery models describe the charging/discharging curves. Using these
detailed models of battery charging, one can carefully investigate the charging
behavior of an individual EV and the impact on the grid. However, the detailed
model of batteries does not help when considering the large scale of charging.
2.2.1 A Simplified EV Charging model
For the purpose of large scale charging, the detailed battery model is usually lin-
earized and simplified. In this setting, the SOC of electricity vehicles is assumed
to be linear with the charging time or the consumed energy. This assumption is
acceptable since the exponential areas of the battery are relatively small and the
charging demand of EVs usually falls into the linear section.
Here we present a simplified EV charging model. The charging request from
an EV Ji is specified by the tuple Ji = (ri, di, ji), where ri ∈ R+ is the time when
the EV arrives at the charger and the charging can begin, di ∈ R+ the deadline
by which the charging should be completed, ji ∈ R+ how much the consumer
requires to charge.
Nowadays, the control of chargers is often characterized as on/off opera-
tions. When the scheduler activates one charger, the EV attached to the charger
22
is charged at a fixed charging rate; when the scheduler deactivate the charger,
no power flows through. When the charging rate is constant, the charging de-
mand can be measured by the charging time instead of the energy by dividing
the energy by the charging rate times the energy efficiency.
Figure 3.2 gives an example of a linearized EV charging model. The deadline
of EV Ji satisfies di ≥ ri + ji at its arrival, where ji(t) is the remaining charging
time to be completed at time t. The leading time Ti(t) and laxity li(t) at time t are
defined in (2.1).
Ti(t) = (di − t)+, li(t) = (Ti(t) − ji(t))+. (2.1)
where b+ = max{0, b}.
Figure 2.5: EV attributes.
After introducing the charging models of electric vehicles, we present three
frameworks of EV charging in different contexts.
2.3 Home charging models and impacts on distribution sys-
tems.
The most commonly used charging method would be charging at home using
level 1 or level 2 charging outlets. In this section, we present the charging frame-
work of a single EV in a residential house. Figure 2.6 shows the main architec-
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Figure 2.6: Architecture of home energy management system
ture of a home energy management system (HEMs) [150]. A complete home
energy management system should be able to optimally control the charging of
EVs and other appliances according to the desire of users and the information
collected from the electricity aggregator and other sources. The complete HEMs
should include the following functions.
• Direct Control: Sends the real time control signal to EVs and other end-use
devices or controls the operation status directly.
• Measurements, Modeling and Prediction: Takes measurements of loads
and models the behavior of EVs as well as the human activity patterns.
Predicts into the future about the behavior of EVs and other information.
• User Interface: Provides customers with statistics on the power usage and
allows users to adjust the settings.
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• Information Interface: Exchanges price, power profile and weather infor-
mation with aggregators and numerical weather stations.
• Control Algorithm: Optimally schedule the EV charging and control of
other devices to maintain the comfort level of users subject to power limits,
budget constraints and physical constraints.
Within this architecture, users upload the charging amount of EVs, the dead-
line at which EVs leave home, and other daily load profile through HEMs and
aggregators determine and release the real-time electric price or direct control
signal based on the profile collection. Taking in price signals and numerical
weather reports, HEMs schedules the charging of EVs and allocates power to
other end devices to maintain the comfort level and finish task required by user-
s.
2.3.1 Charging scheduling of single EV
In this subsection, we present a generic formulation of the scheduling problem
of single EV charging. Here we assume the state of charging (SOC) is linear in
the power consumptions and discharging is forbidden. Since the real-time elec-
tric price is released every 5 minutes or 15 minutes, we assume time is slotted2
and indexed by t. Assume the scheduler knows the charging cost and the EV is
attached to the charger from t = 0 to t = T − 1. The scheduling problem can be
2In this monograph, we use “(t)” to indicate the continuous time and “[t]” to indicate the
discrete time
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formulated as a optimization problem as follows.
min
∑T−1
t=0 Ct(u[t])
subject to
∑T
t=0 u[t] = j
0 ≤ u[t] ≤ umax,∀t.
(2.2)
where u[t] is the charging rate of the EV within time slot t, Ct(·) the charging cost
as a function of the charging rate, j the required charging amount, T the plug-in
duration (or the lead time on arrival), and umax the maximum charging rate.
In general, the charging cost function Ct(·) would include the energy cost of
purchasing power, the cost offset by the renewable energy, and the regulation
price. If the cost function is linear, i.e., Ct(u[t]) = c[t]u[t], the problem (2.2) be-
comes a linear program, which can be easily solved by “Simplex” method or
other commercial solver.
Now we present some characteristics of the optimal solution of (2.2) un-
der the linear cost assumption. In this case, assume there exists an opti-
mal charging profile {u[t]} = {u[0], · · · , u[T − 1]} and u[t1], u[t2] ∈ {u[t]} such that
0 < u[t1], u[t2] < umax. It follows that
Ct1(u[t1]) +Ct2(u[t2]) = c[t1]u[t1] + c[t2]u[t2]
= c[t1](u[t1] + u[t2]) + u[t2](c[t2] − c[t1])
If the sum of power, (u[t1]+u[t2]), is kept constant, then this becomes a linear
equation with respect to u[t2]. The extreme occur only at both ends of the range
of u[t2]. Thus there exists an optimal scheduling such that u[t] should be either 0
or umax3. This result implicates that charging control should be an on/off control
at the maximum charging rate to minimize the charging cost.
3Assume the required charging amount j is a multiple of umax.
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In (2.2), the future charging cost function Ct(·) is assumed known by the
scheduler. However, the cost is in general stochastic. The charging cost is ba-
sically the electricity price offset by the local renewable energy. The electricity
price is determined by the operation status of the power grid and the demand.
The renewable energy is significantly affected by the weather. The randomness
is one of the major difficulties in the scheduling problem.
Different approaches have been proposed to deal with the randomness in
charging cost, EV arrival and charging capacity, including dynamic program-
ming [60], Markov decision processes [153], model predictive control [48], and
so on. Some of these approaches will be discussed in the following chapters.
2.4 Large Scale Charging in Distribution System
In this section, we discuss the framework of the large-scale EV charging in a
distribution system. As shown in Figure 2.7, EVs are attached to residential
houses or public chargers distributed in a wide area. A service aggregator, who
purchases power from the grid and supply the charging services, connects the
power grid and EV customers. EVs communicate the charging scheduling and
charging prices with the aggregator through the chargers. The aggregator col-
lects information of multiple chargers and receives the information about the
power grid, including the power limit, wholesale energy price, and ancillary
service requirement. Based on the information, the aggregator optimally sched-
ules the charging of EVs by directly sending the control signal or affects the
charging decision of EVs indirectly by price signals.
For large-scale EV charging, there are two ways of scheduling, centralized
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(direct) control, and decentralized (indirect) control. The centralized control
framework assumes the scheduler has direct access to each EV and can make a
direct decision on the charge scheduling. This structure requires more compu-
tational power and information communication between EVs and the aggrega-
tor. On the other hand, this framework is more likely to achieve optimality. In
the centralized framework, assuming the future information about the EVs and
the power grid is available, it is shown that the optimal solution satisfies the
valley-filling property [98]. A valley-filling aggregate charging schedule sched-
ules more EVs when the total electricity demand (or equivalently, the electricity
price) is low to fill the valley and minimize the charging cost.
The decentralized framework shares the same presence and goals of the
aggregator/scheduler with the centralized control. The difference is the in-
formation and where the charging schedules are calculated. In the decentral-
ized charging framework, the scheduler acts as a coordinator that designs the
incentive structure so that the scheduling of EVs minimizes the total cost or
achieves other goals of the aggregator. Each EV makes provisional charging
decisions and determines its charging schedule according to the aggregator in-
centives. The decentralized framework distribute the computation burden from
the scheduler to individual EV chargers. Each charger solves a much smaller
scale problem which relieves the computation cost brought by the large popu-
lation of EVs. Another benefit is the privacy of the EVs. EVs may be reluctant
to upload details of their demand directly to the aggregator. In the decentral-
ized framework, no information but the proposed charging profile of each EV
is given out. Despite of these advantages, the stability and optimality of the de-
centralized charging remain unclear. EVs tend to cluster the charging schedule
to the valley of the price which potentially brings up the total cost and lead-
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s to unstable scheduling process. One approach to overcome the instability is
to impose penalty of changing charging profiles in the incentives. Besides the
charging cost, the aggregator penalizes the EVs who dramatically changes their
charging plan or deviates from the trend of the total charging profile. Detailed
algorithms can be found in [98], [48], and [84]. Under some conditions, the out-
come of the decentralized algorithms converges to the optimal solution under
the centralized framework.
Figure 2.7: Architecture of home energy management system
2.5 Large scale charging at public facilities
In this section, we present the framework of EV charging in public charging fa-
cilities. In US, there are several major parties that invest in public EV charging
stations. The government spends in charging stations in public facilities such
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as hospitals and schools due to the environmental consideration. The business
runners of grocery stores and shopping malls build charging stations near their
business to attract customers for the primary business, provide a bonus service
for employees, and boost the sustainability credentials. The major national op-
erators of charging stations, such as ChargePoint and eVgo, invest in charging
service targeting the rapid growing EV market. The manufactories of EVs build
charging stations to boost the market share of their products and provide after
sale services to loyal consumers.
The placement of charging facilities affects the favorability of each station.
Factors that influence this may include but are not limited to variations in ac-
cessibility and availability of service other than charging, e.g., tyre inflator and
mini market. Accessibility refers to how easy it is for consumers to access the
charging station and potentially affects the volume of the passenger flow. A
similar discussion is presented for gas stations by Salop [125] and Hotelling
[66]. For example, a site at a workplace parking lot may be more attractive than
a location that is less frequently visited by consumers. Ancillary services refer
to other services that a charging station may provide such as vehicle repair and
supermarkets. Kroger, the largest grocery store owner of the U.S., has installed
over 300 Level 2 and DC fast charging stations in the major markets over the
country [56]. Walmart and Kohl’s also expanded their charging stations [54, 55].
These public charging station locations are also favored by EV owners since they
can charge while shopping.
The intelligent energy management system (iEMS) architecture for public
charging stations is illustrated in Figure 2.8. The scheduler here is the owner or
the operator of the charging facilities, it is natural to consider centralized con-
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Figure 2.8: Architecture for network switched charging and iEMS.
trol. The hardware system of the proposed iEMS includes a dispatcher that de-
livers power from a mix of energy sources–local energy (e.g., renewable energy
and local storage) and purchased electricity from the grid–to tens or hundreds
of chargers. By sending out the control signal, the scheduler activates and de-
activates the chargers connected to EVs admitted to the facility to serve more
urgent or more profitable requests.
The iEMS is run by the software system that makes engineering and eco-
nomic decisions. At the core of the software system for the iEMS is the charge
scheduling algorithm, which is the focus of this monograph. The scheduler (i)
sets the connections of the switch so that a subset of EVs are charged by the
available chargers, and (ii) determines the admission of new EVs based on it-
s charging demand and the system operating condition. The software system
also has to handle billing, other ancillary services and possibly the forecast of
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available renewable in the future.
2.6 Interaction between EV charging and the grid
Besides the charging station, EVs are viewed as a possible solution to integrating
the renewable energy to the power grid. One of the impact of EVs on renewable
energy is load shifting.
The typical daily demand curve is shown in Figure 2.9. The daily peak hap-
pens after 6 PM and falls to the valley around 3 AM. The big ramp causes re-
liability problem to the grid. The existence of power peak makes reserve gen-
eration necessary which costs much higher than a regular generation. Another
issue is the peak of renewable generation and the peak of demand do not over-
lap naturally. The peak of wind power usually happens in the evening, and
solar energy reaches a peak around noon. Without sufficient storage, the output
of renewables will be limited due to the grid consideration.
However, large-scale charging of EVs would play a role in load shifting. At
the peak of renewable energy, energy management systems can schedule more
charging of EVs and consume the output of wind and solar. When the demand
reaches the peak, EVs may supply power back to the electricity grid and relieve
the burden of the reserves. In this way, the charging of EVs shifts the load peak
to the valley and “shaves” the demand curve. The flat curve would require
fewer reserves, consume more green energy and make the grid more reliable.
The other benefit of V2G would be ancillary services provided by EVs. The
output of renewables, such as solar and wind, is typically random and uncon-
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Figure 2.9: Load curve of New York ISO, November 8th, 2016
trollable. As shown in Figure 2.10, the output of renewables changes rapidly
and randomly due to the weather. These fluctuation together with demand os-
cillations cause the electricity frequency deviations and harm the generators,
transformers and end use devices. Usually, renewable generators need large
storages, expensive devices, to hedge this uncertainty. However, when large-
scale EVs take part of the ancillary service market, this oscillation can be dealt
by EV batteries. When the renewable output dips, the EV charging station can
suspend charging and reduce the power consumption to help to restore the fre-
quency. In this way, the renewable generators do not need to build large capac-
ity storages. The revenue collected from the ancillary services subsidize the EV
consumers and makes the charging more economical. Meanwhile, the power
grid receives cleaner energy and has a more robust system.
Figure 2.11 illustrates an example of EV charging station participating in the
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Figure 2.10: Solar power output in a typical day
ancillary service market. In the day-ahead market, the charging station needs
to submit the demand bids to the ISO. The bids include an expected demand
curve of the next day and a range within which the charging station promises
to adjust the power consumption in response to the request of ISO. In the real-
time, the ISO releases the electricity price and the regulation signal which the
charging station is required to follow. The ancillary service revenue will be paid
from the ISO to the charging facility according to the adjustment range and the
accuracy and speed of the response.
In the following chapters, we will present the detailed formulation and ap-
proaches of EV charging in a distribution system, in a public charging station,
and in the vehicle-to-grid service.
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Figure 2.11: Charging station participating demand response.
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CHAPTER 3
AN ONLINE CENTRALIZED APPROACH OF LARGE-SCALE EV
CHARGING
In the off-line charging problems, the charging algorithm requires the infor-
mation of the future, e.g., the charging cost function, the arrival and departure
time of EVs. However, these kinds of information are hard to obtain, sometimes
even impossible. The future electricity price depends on the operation status of
generators, the output of the renewables, the state of the transmission network,
and the demand of other consumers. The arrivals of EVs and charging demand
are determined by individual human behaviors. These kinds of uncertainty
make it extremely hard to forecast.
Instead of requiring to know the future exactly, we consider a stochastic
scheduling problem, in which, the scheduler is assumed to know only the cur-
rent information of electricity price and states of EVs that are already in the
charging station. The information about future charging cost and EV arrivals,
besides some statistics and probability distributions, is not known until the time
it is revealed. Under this assumption, the stochastic scheduling problem is to
seek a policy that achieves the average optimality overall randomness.
The stochastic scheduling of public charging facilities faces a different set of
technical challenges from those associated with the convex optimizations dis-
cussed in the previous chapters
First, there is a high level of uncertainty in charging demand. EVs arrive at
a charging facility randomly, each with stochastic demand and arbitrary dead-
lines that are revealed to the scheduler after the arrival. This randomness makes
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it difficult for the scheduler to meet consumer needs.
Second, the cost (or the profit) of the service provider may be stochastic.
For instance, the service provider may participate in the wholesale electricity
market and is subject to real-time price fluctuations. Also, the service provider
may integrate local renewable energy such as solar with intermittent generation.
Here we assume the charging station is a price-taker, which means the charg-
ing cost will be stochastic and independent of the total demand at the time of
charging.
Third, fast charging techniques are usually used in the public charging sta-
tions. The level 2 charger and DC fast charger consume significant power and
may have detrimental effects on power system reliability [22, 133] and life time
of devices [29, 120]. Thus it is necessary to impose a power limit of the public
charging station considering the capacity of transformers and the thermal limit
of the transmission line. This power limit translates to a constraint of the num-
ber of simultaneous charging EVs. Due to this capacity limit, it may be infeasible
to finish charging of all EVs and a penalty may incur due to the economic and
reputation loss.
Thus, the objective of the scheduler is to maximize the expected discounted
or average charging profit (or equivalently, to minimize the charging cost and
incompletion penalty) subject to the power limit. However, the energy man-
agement system that schedules EV charging operates in real time. Therefore,
the scheduling algorithm must be scalable on the size of the charging facility,
which rules out the use of brute-force optimization techniques. In fact, some-
times the optimal solution does not exist. Thus people are interested in some
simple heuristics those are in general not optimal, but scalable and perform rea-
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Figure 3.1: Architecture of a charging station
sonably well.
3.1 An MDP Formulation of Stochastic Deadline Scheduling
We now formulate the EV charging problem as a stochastic deadline scheduling
problem subject to charging capacity constraints.
Figure 3.1 shows a schematic of an energy management system at an EV
charging facility. We assume that the facility has N parking spots, each with
a charger. The charging rate of each charger is assumed identical and fixed.
This is likely to be a case of practical significance, as charging rates of EVs are
constrained by their design specifications and charging station technology.
The electricity price from the ISO is updated every 15 minutes or every hour.
So it is reasonable to consider discrete time framework, where the time is slot-
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ted and indexed by t. At the beginning of each time slot, new EVs arrive at the
facility randomly and the scheduler randomly assign a parking spot to it. The
EV owner communicates the charging demand ji, and the deadline for comple-
tion di to the scheduler. Since the charging rate is fixed, the charging demand
ji is measured in charging time. The scheduler receives the information and
updates the charging cost and the state of chargers in the system. Then the
scheduler makes a decision on which chargers to activate or deactivate in the
current slot. The power limit translates to a constraint on the number of EVs
that are simultaneously being charged. At the end of each time slot, EVs that
hit their deadlines leave the charging station regardless whether the charging is
completed.
The assumptions of this chapter are summarized as follows; they are approx-
imations of practical operating conditions and are made for tractable analytical
developments.
A1. The time is slotted, indexed by t.
A2. The EV arrival process of each charger is independent and identically dis-
tributed (i.i.d.) with probability mass function Q(T, j) where T is the lead
time defined by the number of time slots before the deadline, and j the
charging demand defined by the number of time slots required for com-
pletion. Here Q(0, 0) is the probability that no EV arrives. Upon arrival, an
EV reveals (T, j) to the scheduler.
A3. At each time, at most M EVs can be simultaneously charged. The activa-
tion/deactivation of chargers incurs no cost.
A4. If an EV is charged in time slot t, it generates a unit payment to the charg-
ing station and incurs a time varying cost c[t]. We assume that c[t] is a
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homogeneous finite state Markov chain whose evolution is independent
of the actions of the scheduler[71, 87].
A5. If the charging demand of an EV is not fulfilled by the deadline, a penalty
defined by a convex function of the amount of unfinished charging de-
mand is imposed on the scheduler at the end of the deadline.
Some comments and clarifications on these assumptions are in order. The
i.i.d. arrival assumption in A2 is somewhat limiting but necessary for obtain-
ing index policies. This is also consistent with the standard Poisson arrival case
when the the arrived EV is randomly assigned to a charger in the charging sta-
tion. A2 implies that when an EV arrives at a charger that is occupied by an un-
finished EV, the newly arrived EV is dropped, which seems unreasonable since
the EV could have been assigned to an open charger (if it exists). Asymptotically
when N → ∞, there is no loss of performance by imposing these assumptions.
Assumption A4 assumes that the marginal payment from each EV is the
same. This can be generalized easily to the case that when the price of com-
pleting the EV is a function of the deadline—the so-called service differentiated
deadline scheduling problem [12]—by including the initial lead time in the state
of the EV. In this case, the charging station will assign different marginal charg-
ing price to EVs with different deadlines (or laxity) at their arrival. The initial
deadline or laxity is included in the state of the EV and the reward function will
be a function of this state. The analysis and results stay the same.
Next, we formulate the constrained MDP by defining the state, the action of
the scheduler, the state evolution, the reward, the constraints, and the decision
policy.
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We now define the constrained MDP by defining the state, the action of the
scheduler, reward, the state evolution, constraints, and the decision policy.
3.1.1 State space
Consider first the state of the i-th charger in the station. Let Ti[t] , di − t be the
lead time to deadline di, and ji[t] is the remaining charging demand measured
in charging time, as illustrated in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: An illustration for the charger’s state. ri is the arrival time of an
EV at charger i, di the deadline for completion, ji[t] the amount
of charging to be completed by di, Ti[t] the lead time to dead-
line.
The state of the i-th charger is defined as
S i[t]
∆
=

(0, 0) if no EV waits at the ith charger,
(Ti[t], ji[t]) otherwise,
The state of the charging cost is denoted by c[t] which is assumed to form a
Markov chain with transmission probability P = [Pk,k′].
The state of the MDP is defined by the states of all chargers and the charging
cost c[t] as S [t]∆=(c[t], S 1[t], · · · , S N[t]) ∈ S and S the state space.
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3.1.2 Action
The action of the scheduler in time slot t is defined by the binary vector a[t] =
(a1[t], · · · , aN[t]) ∈ {0, 1}N where ai[t] = 1 means that charging at charger i is
activated, for which the charger is referred as active. The complement, ai[t] = 0,
is when charger i is passive, i.e., charging is suspended. For convenience, we
allow a charger without an EV to be activated, in which case the charger receives
no reward and incurs no cost.
3.1.3 State evolution
We assume that the charging cost c[t] evolves as an exogenous finite state
Markov chain with transition probability matrix P = [Pk,k′]. Given the current
charging cost c[t] = ck, the next charging cost will be c[t + 1] = ck′ with probabili-
ty Pk,k′ . The evolution of the charging cost is independent of the actions taken by
the scheduler. The Markov chain of charing cost c[t] can be illustrated in Figure
3.3.
The evolution of chargers’ states depend on the scheduling action
a[t] = {ai[t]}Ni=1. When Ti > 1, the EV is not leaving the system by the end of
this time slot and the lead time will decrease by 1. If the EV is not fulfilled, the
remaining charging demand will reduce by 1 if the charger is active ai = 1, and
remain the same otherwise. If the EV is fulfilled, we assume the charger can also
be activated. However, no energy will be delivered and no charging cost will
incur. Given ai[t], the state evolution is stated as follows.
(Ti[t + 1], ji[t + 1]) = (Ti[t] − 1, ( ji[t] − ai[t])+).
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Figure 3.3: An illustration for the charging cost evolution. Given the cur-
rent state ck, the next state will be ck′ with probability Pk,k′ .
where b+ = max(b, 0).
When the deadline is reached, Ti = 1, the EV leaves the system by the end of
this time interval. The probability mass function (PMF) Q(·, ·) governs the initial
states of newly arrived EVs, where Q(0, 0) means there is no new arrival in this
interval. Formally, the state evolution of charger i with state S i[t] under action
ai[t] = 1 is given by
S i[t + 1] =

(Ti[t] − 1, ( ji[t] − ai[t])+) Ti[t] > 1,
(T, j) with prob. Q(T, j) Ti[t] ≤ 1.
(3.1)
where b+ = max(b, 0).
The entire Markov chain of a charger given action a = 1 is summarized in
Figure 3.4. The support of the lead time and charging demand is assumed finite
since usually consumers charge an EV less than one day.
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Figure 3.4: An illustration for the charger state evolution given the charger
is activated. T¯ is the maximum lead time and j¯ the maximum
charging demand.
3.1.4 Reward
For each EV, the scheduler obtain one unit of reward if the EV is charged for one
time slot. At the EV’s deadline, i.e., Ti[t] = 1, the scheduler pays the penalty for
the unfinished work. Let F( j) be the convex penalty function of the amount j of
the unfinished charging, and F(0) = 0. Denote the cost of charging at time t by
c[t]. Thus the reward collected from charger i at time t is given by
Rai[t](S i[t], c[t])
=

(1 − c[t])ai[t], if ji[t] > 0, Ti[t] > 1,
(1 − c[t])ai[t] − F( ji[t] − ai[t]), if ji[t] > 0, Ti[t] = 1,
0, otherwise,
(3.2)
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The total reward collected from N chargers given the system state s and the
action vector a is simply the sum.
Ra(s) =
∑
i
Rai(si, c)
3.1.5 Objective Function
Given the initial system state S [0] = (c[t], S 1[t], · · · , S N[t]) = s and a policy pi that
maps each system state S [t] to an action vector a[t], the expected discounted
system reward is defined by
Gpi(s)
∆
=Epi
 ∞∑
t=0
N∑
i=1
βtRai[t](S i[t]) | S [0] = s
 , (3.3)
where Epi is the conditional expectation over the randomness in costs and EVs
arrival under a given scheduling policy pi and 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor.
The analysis can be extended to the average case [37].
3.1.6 Constrained MDP and Optimal Policies
In practice, there is usually a power limit of the public charging station due
to the thermal limit of the transmission line and the capacity constraint of the
transformer, which is different in the setting of home charging. Assuming the
charging rate of each charger is the same, this power constraint translates to a
constraint on the number of simultaneously activated chargers, i.e.,
∑N
i ai[t] ≤ M
for all t. This constraint imposes a difficulty on the scheduling problem and
sometimes makes the optimality not achievable.
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The EV charging scheduling problem can be formulated as a constrained
MDP. The maximum expected reward is given by
G(s) = sup
{pi:∑Ni apii [t]≤M,∀t}Gpi(s), (3.4)
where apii [t] is the action generated by policy pi. A policy pi
∗ is optimal if
Gpi∗(s) = G(s). Without loss of optimality, we will restrict our attention to sta-
tionary policies [4].
3.1.7 A Linear Approach
To solve the constrained MDP problem in (3.4), we can use either the linear pro-
gramming approach (cf. Chap. 3 of [4]) or the dynamic programming approach
(cf. Chap. 2 of [117]). Here we introduce the linear programming method.
For each system state s ∈ S, denoteA(s) the feasible set of actions. ThusA(s)
describes the charging capacity constraint and any action vector a ∈ A(s) satis-
fies
∑
i ai ≤ M. For any policy pi, we can denote ρ(s, a) the occupation measure of
state s and action a under policy pi and initial state s0. It can be viewed as the
probability that state s is visited and action a is carried out.
It is shown that [4], the measure belongs to the set of measures that satisfy
ρ(s, a) ≥ 0,∀s, a∑
s
∑
a ρ(s, a) = 1∑
a ρ(s, a) = β
∑
s′
∑
a ρ(s′, a)Pas,s′ ,∀s , s0∑
a ρ(s0, a) = 1 − β + β∑s′ ∑a ρ(s′, a)Pas,s′ ,
where Pas,s′ is the transition probability from state s to s
′ given action a. The
probability needs to be positive and the sum equals to one. There is also an
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equality relationship between the measure ruled by the transition matrix.
Thus the constrained MDP in (3.4) is equivalent to the linear programming
as follows.
maxρ
∑
s∈S
∑
a∈A(s) Ra(s)ρ(s, a)
subject to
∑
s
∑
a ρ(s, a) = 1
ρ(s, a) ≥ 0,∀s, a∑
a ρ(s, a) = β
∑
s′
∑
a ρ(s′, a)Pas,s′ ,∀s , s0∑
a ρ(s0, a) = 1 − β + β∑s′ ∑a ρ(s′, a)Pas,s′ ,
(3.5)
where the objective is to maximize the expected total reward. The optimizer,
ρ∗(s, a), gives the optimal policy. For any state s such that
∑
a ρ
∗(s, a) > 0, the
optimal policy is to choose action a′ with probability ρ∗(s, a′)/
∑
a ρ
∗(s, a).
Note that, the feasible set A(s) contains all actions that choose less than M
chargers out of N. The size ofA(s) is exponentially increasing as N grows. Thus
the complexity of the linear programming (3.5) easily explodes and makes the
approach computationally unattractive. Thus we want to look for some policies
that have linear complexity and perform close to optimality.
3.1.8 A Performance Upper Bound
In (3.4), the power limit must be satisfied for all t. By relaxing this constraint
and requiring that the average power usage does not exceed M, we obtain a
performance upper bound for (3.4). In particular, a relaxed problem can be
stated as
suppi Epi
{∑∞
t=0
∑N
i=1 β
tRai[t](S i[t], c[t]) | S [0]
}
subject to (1 − β)E∑∞t=0 ∑Ni=1 βtai[t] ≤ M. (3.6)
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Problem (3.6) is not a practical formulation for the large scale EV charging since
the power usage could be far more than M at certain time.
Since the charging cost is the same for all chargers, the relaxed problem (3.6)
is equivalent to the following problem (on the scheduling of a single charger i).
suppi NEpi
{∑∞
t=0 β
tRai[t](S i[t], c[t]) | S i[0], c[0]
}
subjec to (1 − β)E∑∞t=0 βtai[t] ≤ M/N. (3.7)
Problem (3.7) seeks to maximize the discounted reward from a single charger
i with no more than M/N active action (per time period) on average. The optimal
solution and the optimal objective of (3.7) are the same as those of (3.6). The
optimal objective of (3.7) can be used as a performance upper bound for the
original scheduling problem in (3.4).
The constrained MDP problem in (3.7) has a much smaller dimensionality
and can be easily solved by linear programming as mentioned in (3.5).
3.2 Deadline Scheduling as An RMAB Problem
The constrained MDP problem stated in the previous sections falls into the cate-
gory of restless multi-armed bandit (RMAB) problem. In probability theory, the
classic multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem is the problem in which, the gam-
bler at a row of N slot machines (sometimes referred as ont-armed bandit) has
to decide which M machines to play at each time to maximize the reward. In
its original setting, each machine, if played, provides a random reward from
a probability distribution specific to that machine and the state of the machine
changes according to a Markov chain. Machines that are not played provides
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no reward and stay frozen.
Gittins first proposed an index policy that provides a scalable solution [51].
An index policy computes an indic for each arm according to the state and char-
acteristics (e.g., transitions, rewards) ignoring other arms. Then it ranks all arms
by the index and choose to play the top M arms. This kind of policies decouple
the complicated MDP problem into N smaller problem and decouple arms, thus
are scalable. Clearly, index policies are not optimal in general. However, Gittins
showed that, when M = 1, the Gittins index policy is in fact optimal.
Whittle extended the classic MAB problem to restless multi-armed bandits
(RMAB) [143]. In the classic setting, the arms that are not played (deactivat-
ed) provide no reward and stay frozen. In a RMAB, however, deactivated arms
change states and generate reward as well, maybe according to different prob-
ability distributions from the ones of the activated case. Whittle, inspired by
Gittin, proposed the Whittle’s index policy. The intuition of Whittle’s index is
based on the subsidy. For each individual arm, whenever it is not played (idle),
a subsidy is provided on the top of the original reward. Whittle’s index is the
smallest subsidy such that the deactivation is the same attractive as the active
action for this arm. In the classic MAB setting, Whittle’s index is shown to de-
generate to Gittin’s index. In the RMAB setting, the Whittle’s index is shown to
be asymptotically optimal as the scale of the problem grows under some condi-
tions. However, these conditions are usually hard to check.
In this section, we see to obtain an index policy following the principle of
Whittle’s index. Specifically, the index of charger i is a mapping from its extend-
ed state S˜ i[t] , (S i[t], c[t]) to a index value.
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An RMAB Formulation
We now formulate Problem (3.4) as a restless multi-armed bandit (RMAB) prob-
lem. We identify each charger in the station as an arm. To this end, “playing”
an arm is equivalent to activate a charger to charge the EV (if there is one) in
the station. The resulting multi-armed bandit problem is restless because the
state of a charger, in particular, the lead time evolves even if the charger is not
activated.
A complication of casting (3.4) as an RMAB problem comes from the in-
equality constraint on the maximum number of simultaneous activated charg-
ers. This complication can be circumvented by introducing M dummy chargers
and requiring that exactly M chargers must be activated in each period. Specifi-
cally, each dummy charger always accrues zero reward, and the state of dummy
chargers stays at S i = (0, 0). We let {1, · · · ,N} be the set of regular chargers that
generate reward (penalty) and {N + 1, · · · ,N + M} be the set of dummy charg-
ers. By including dummy chargers, the MDP in (3.4) is equivalent to an RMAB
problem where exactly M out of N + M chargers (arms) are active in each time
slot.
We define the extended state of each charger as S˜ i[t] , (S i[t], c[t]), and denote
the extended state space as S˜i , Si × Sc. The state transition of each arm and the
associated rewards are inherited from ( 3.1- 3.2) of the original MDP.
The corresponding RMAB problem is defined by
suppi Epi
{∑∞
t=0
∑N+M
i=1 β
tRai[t](S˜ i[t]) | S˜ i[0]
}
s.t.
∑N+M
i=1 ai[t] = M, ∀ t.
(3.8)
In (3.8), the arms are coupled by the charging cost and period index, and are not
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independent.
3.3 Whittle’s Index Policy
To pursue the EV charging problem as an RMAB, we need to establish the in-
dexability of the RMAB and examine the performance.
3.3.1 Indexability
Consider the ν-subsidized single arm reward maximization problem [143] that
looks for a policy pi to activate/deactivate the arm to maximize the discounted
accumulative reward:
Vνi (s) = sup
pi
Epi
 ∞∑
t=0
βtRνai[t](S˜ i[t]) | S˜ i[0] = s
 , (3.9)
where the subsidized reward is modified single arm reward (3.2) given by
Rνai[t](S˜ i[t]) = Rai[t](S˜ i[t]) + ν1(ai[t] = 0),
where 1(·) is the indicator function. In words, the ν-subsidized problem is a mod-
ification of the reward such that the scheduler receives a subsidy ν whenever
the arm is passive.
Let La be an operator on Vνi defined by
(LaVνi )(s) , E
(
Vνi (S˜ i[t + 1])
∣∣∣∣∣S˜ i[t] = s, ai[t] = a) .
The maximum discounted reward Vνi (·) in (3.9) is determined by the Bellman
equation
Vνi (s) = maxa∈{0,1}
{
Rνa(s) + β(LaVνi )(s)
}
. (3.10)
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Let Si be the space of extended state of arm i and Si(ν) the set of states
under which it is optimal to take the passive action in the ν-subsidy problem.
The indexability of the RMAB is defined by the monotonicity of Si(ν) as subsidy
level ν increases:
Definition 1 (Indexability [143]). Arm i is indexable if the setSi(ν) increases mono-
tonically from ∅ toSi as ν increases from −∞ to +∞. The MAB problem is indexable if
all arms are indexable.
We establish the indexability for the EV charging scheduling problem.
Theorem 1 (Indexability). Each arm is indexable and the RMAB problem (3.8) is
indexable.
Proof. The proof of Theorem 1 can be found in Appendix A.1. 
3.3.2 Whittle’s index policy
Given the definition of indexability, the Whittle’s index is defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Whittle’s index [143]). If arm i is indexable, its Whittle’s index νi(s) of
state s is the infimum of the subsidy ν under which the passive action is optimal at state
s, i.e.,
νi(s) , inf
ν
{ν : R0(s) + ν + β(L0Vνi )(s) ≥ R1(s) + β(L1Vνi )(s)}.
Thus if arm i is indexable, any ν < νi(s˜) makes activating arm i optimal.
Likewise, any ν ≥ νi(s) makes it optimal to deactivate arm i.
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To compute the Whittle’s index, we need to solve a parametric programming
where the subsidy ν forms the constraints. For arm i, the formulation is stated
as follows.
minµi(s)
∑
s∈S p(s)µi(s)
s.t. µi(s) ≥ R1(s) + β∑s′∈S P1s,s′µi(s′)
µi(s) ≥ R0(s) + ν + β∑s′∈S P0s,s′µi(s′)
where s = (T, j, c) is the extended state of arm i, p(s) the initial-state probability,
and Pas,s′ the transition probability from s to s
′ given action a. For particular
value of ν, the optimal solution µ∗i (s) equals to the value function Vi(s) and the
active constraints give the optimal action. Solving this parametric programming
is to find the break point of ν where the optimal action changes. A simplex
method to solve the parametric programming is described in [26].
The special structure of the deadline problem, however, allows us to have a
closed-form solution when the charging cost is constant.
Theorem 2. If c[t] = c0 for all t, the Whittle’s index of a regular arm i ∈ {1, · · · ,N} is
given by
νi(T, j, c0) =

0 if j = 0,
1 − c0 if 1 ≤ j ≤ T − 1,
1 − c0 + βT−1[F( j − T + 1) − F( j − T )] if T ≤ j.
(3.11)
The Whittle’s index of a dummy arm is zero.
νi(0, 0, c0) = 0, i ∈ {N + 1, · · · ,N + M}.
Proof. The proof of closed-form of Whittle’s index with constant charging cost
can be found in Appendix A.2. 
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In (3.11), when it is feasible to finish EV i’s request (i.e. its lead time is no
less than its remaining charging time), charger i’s Whittle’s index is simply the
(per-unit) charging profit 1 − c0. When non-completion penalty is inevitable,
the index takes into account both the charging profit and the non-completion
penalty. We note that the Whittle’s index gives higher priority to EVs with less
laxity. Here, the laxity of EV i is defined as Li[t] , Ti[t] − ji[t] (cf. Figure 3.2).
Given the definition of Whittle’s index, the Whittle’s index policy for the
deadline scheduling problem is stated as follows.
Definition 3 (Whittle’s index policy). For the RMAB problem defined in (3.8), the
Whittle’s index policy sorts all arms by their Whittle’s indices in a descend order and
activates the first M arms.
Since the states of EVs and charging cost are finite, the Whittle’s index can be
computed off-line. In real-time scheduling, at the beginning of each time slot,
the scheduler looks up the indices for each charger and activates the ones with
highest indices. When there is a tie, the scheduler breaks the tie randomly with
a uniform distribution.
3.4 Performance of Whittle’s Index Policy for Finite-Armed
Restless Bandits
In this section, we examine the performance of Whittle’s index policy for the
stochastic deadline scheduling problem when the power limit (M) is finite. We
show that when M < N, there does not exist an optimal index policy, hence
Whittle’s index policy is not optimal. We further derive an upper bound on
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the gap-to-optimality on the performance of the Whittle’s index policy. This re-
sult provides the essential ingredient for establishing asymptotic optimality of
Whittle’s index policy in the next section.
3.4.1 Performance in the Finite Power limit Cases
In general, Whittle’s index policy is not optimal except in some special cases
[93]. For the deadline scheduling problem, the same conclusion holds. We show
in fact that no index policy exists.
Property 1. An optimal index policy for the RMAB problem formulated in (3.8) does
not exist in general when M < N. When M = N, the Whittle’s index policy is optimal.
Proof. The fact that Whittle’s index policy is optimal when M = N is intuitive
and a formal proof can be found in Appendix C of [149]. To show that optimal
index policy does not exist in general, it suffices to construct a counter example
that no index policy can be optimal.
Set the capacity of the queue to be N = 3, the power limit M = 1, the discount-
ed factor β = 0.4, the penalty function F( j) = j2, and the charging cost c[t] = 1.
Assume the arrival is busy (Q(0, 0) = 0) and the initial laxity is zero (T = j at
arrival). For this small scale MDP, a linear programming formulation is used to
solve for the optimal policy [117].
Consider two different states,
s = ((1, 1), (2, 2), (2, 2))
s′ = ((1, 1), (1, 1), (2, 2))
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where s = ((T1, j1), (T2, j2), (T3, j3)) ∈ S is the state of the system including the
states of each arm.
For state s, the optimal action is to charge EV (2, 2). The EV (2, 2) is preferred
to (1, 1) in this case. Charging (2, 2) will cause 1 instant penalty, and the state
will change to ((T, j), (1, 1), (1, 2)), where (T, j) is a new arrival. In next stage, a
penalty of 2 from the last two EVs will happen. If some policy charges (1, 1)
alternately, there will be no penalty in the first stage and the state will change to
((T, j), (1, 2), (1, 2)). The last two EVs will at lease incur a penalty of 5.
For state s′, the optimal action is to charge the EV (1, 1). The EV (1, 1) is
preferred to (2, 2) in this case. Charging (1, 1) will cause 1 instant penalty, and
the state will change to ((T, j), (T ′, j′), (1, 2)), where (T, j) and (T ′, j′) are new
arrivals. If some policy charges (2, 2) alternately, there will an instant penal-
ty of 2 from the first two EVs in the first stage and the state will change to
((T, j), (T ′, j′), (1, 1)). In this case, a penalty of 1 can be saved by charging (2, 2) in
the previous stage. However, due to the discount factor, it is more profitable to
charge (1, 1).
An index policy assigns each EV an index (that depends only on the EV’s
current state), and charges the EVs with the highest indices [51]. Therefor, for
any “index” policy, the indices of EV (1, 1) and (2, 2) are fixed and the preference
of these two EVs should remain the same in these two cases, which is violated
by the result here. This counter example shows that no “index” policy that is
optimal in general. 
Note that, the Whittle’s index policy is an example of index policies, and
thus is sub-optimal.
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3.4.2 An Upper Bound of the Gap-to-Optimality
In the following lemma, we first establish a result that applies quite generally to
the case for a finite queue size N and finite power limit M.
Lemma 1. Let GN(s) be the optimal value function defined in (3.4) and GNRMAB(s) be
the value function achieved by the Whittle’s index policy, respectively. We have
GN(s) −GNRMAB(s)
≤ C1−βE[IN[t]|IN[t] > M] Pr(IN[t] > M),
(3.12)
where IN[t] is the number of EVs admitted in the station with N chargers within time
[t− T¯ + 1, t], T¯ is the maximum lead time of EVs, and C is a constant determined by the
charging cost and the penalty of non-completion.
The proof can be found in Appendix A.3. The gap-to-optimality is bounded
by the tail expectation of the EVs admitted to the system. Note that, the con-
ditional expectation on the right hand side (RHS) of (3.12) is connected to the
conditional value at risk (CVaR) [115], which measures the expected losses at a
certain risk level and is extremely important in the risk management.
3.4.3 Least Laxity and Longer Processing Time (LLLP) Principle
In this section, we will apply the Less Laxity and Longer remaining Processing
time (LLLP) principle (originally proposed in [147]) to improve the Whittle’s
index policy. The LLLP principle is a priority rule for the scheduling, which is
defined as follows.
Definition 4 (The LLLP Principle). Consider charger (arms) i and i′ at time t. We
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say i′ dominates i (i′  i), if i′ has less laxity and longer remaining charging time, i.e.,
Li′[t] ≤ Li[t] and ji′[t] ≥ ji[t], with at least one of the inequalities strictly holds.
LLLP defines a partial order over the EVs’ states such that the EV with less
laxity and longer remaining charging demand should be given priority. In [147],
the authors applied an interchange argument to show that LLLP could improve
the performance of any given policy along every sample path, and further, there
exists an optimal stationary policy that follows the LLLP principle under mild
conditions.
To apply the LLLP principle, note that the Whittle’s index policy for the
multi-armed bandit problem is a stationary policy: at each time it orders (the
states of) the M+N arms, and activates the first M arms. The proposed heuristic
policy re-order every pair of arms that violates the LLLP principle (cf. Algorith-
m 2). As such, the proposed heuristic policy always gives priority to EVs with
less laxity and longer remaining processing time.
3.5 Asymptotic performance of the Whittle’s Index Policy
In this section, we establish the asymptotic optimality of the Whittle’s index
policy when the EV arrival rate µ and the power limit M increase to infinity
simultaneously while the system stays stable.
We first consider the case when the aggregated arrival of EVs follows a Pois-
son distribution. Let I[t] be the total number of EVs arrived in the system within
[t − T¯ + 1, t], recalling that T¯ is the maximum lead time of EVs. Note that I[t] is
Poisson distributed.
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Algorithm 1: Whittle index with LLLP interchange
1. Calculate the Whittle’s indexes of all arms and sort them in a descend order.
2. Suppose the order of arms is i1, i2, · · · , iM+N .
for j = i1 : iM
for k = iM+1 : iM+N
if k  j in the sense of Definition 4
exchange the orders of j and k
end
end
end
3. Activate the M arms with highest priority.
When the queue at the service center is finite with N chargers, we assume
that each charger receives equally likely 1/Nth of the traffic. Because a newly
arrived EV may be rejected when the assigned charger is occupied, the total
number of EVs IN[t] admitted to the system in slot t satisfies IN[t] ≤ I[t]. How-
ever, as N → ∞, IN[t]→ I[t] in distribution. Define
G(s) −GRMAB(s) , lim sup
N→∞
[GN(s) −GNRMAB(s)],
then
G(s) −GRMAB(s) ≤ C1 − βE[I[t]1(I[t] > M)]. (3.13)
Equation (3.13) characterizes the performance gap for the Whittle’s index
policy for the asymptotic regime as N increases while the arrival process and
power limit stay constant. Now, we check the performance of Whittle’s index
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policy when the charging capacity M increases and the mean of the arrival pro-
cess I[t] also grows as a function.
Theorem 3. Suppose that the aggregated arrival I[t] is Poisson with mean µ. The
Whittle’s index policy is asymptotically optimal as M → ∞ if µ < M/e. In particular,
G(s) −GRMAB(s) = O(µe
−µ
√
M
). (3.14)
The proof of Theorem 3 can be found in Appendix A.4. Beside showing
that the Whittle’s index is asymptotically optimal, it also shows that the gap-to-
optimality decays sub-exponentially when µ grows with M at the constant rate
less than 1/e. When µ grows slower than M, the gap decays to zero but with a
slower rate.
In general, suppose that if we don’t have the aggregated Poisson arrival, but
IN[t] converges in distribution to I¯[t] < I[t] as N → ∞, we can then show similar
results as in Theorem 3.
Theorem 4. Suppose that I[t] had a light tailed distribution with mean µ˜, i.e., there
exist constant a ≥ 1 and b ≥ 0 with
Pr(I[t] ≥ i) ≤ a exp[−ib/µ˜], ∀i ≥ 0. (3.15)
the Whittle’s index policy is asymptotically optimal as M → ∞ if µ˜ = o(M/ lnM). In
particular,
G(s) −GRMAB(s) = O[exp(−Mb
µ˜
)(Mb + µ˜)], (3.16)
Under the heavy tail assumption, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 5. Suppose that I[t] has a heavy tailed distribution with mean µ˜, i.e., there
exist constants a > 0 and b > 2 with
Pr(I[t] ≥ i) ≤ aµ˜/ib,∀i > 0, (3.17)
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the Whittle’s index policy is asymptotically optimal as M → ∞ if µ˜ = o(Mb−1). In
particular,
G(s) −GRMAB(s) = O(µ˜/Mb−1). (3.18)
The proof of Theorem 4 and 5 can be found in Appendix A.5. Theorem 4 and
5 establish the asymptotic optimality of the Whittle’s index policy when both the
job arrivals and the processing capacity grow simultaneously while the overall
system remains stable in different traffic regime.
3.6 Performance
In this section, results of numerical experiments are presented to compare the
performance of the Whittle’s index policy with other simple heuristic (index)
policies, i.e., EDF (earliest deadline first) [92], LLF (least laxity first) [31], and
Whittle’s index policy with LLLP interchange (cf. Algorithm 2).
If feasible, EDF charges M EVs with the earliest deadlines, and LLF charges
M EVs with the least laxity. Both policies will fully utilize the power limit and
activate M EVs as long as there are at least M unfinished EVs in the system.
The Whittle’s index policy, on the other hand, ranks all arms by the Whittle’s
index and activates the first M arms, and may put some (regular) arms idle
(deactivated) when the charging cost is high.
We first consider a special case of problem (3.8) with a constant charging
cost. Since the charging cost is time-invariant, it is optimal to fully utilize the
capacity to charge M unfinished EVs.
In Figure 3.5, we fix the traffic of EVs and the number of chargers N and
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vary the power limit M. All policies besides the EDF scheduling perform well
and close to the upper bound of the performance. When M/N = 1, all EVs can
be finish. Thus all policies achieve optimality. In Figure 3.6, we zoom in the
case when M/N = 0.5 and vary the total number of chargers N. We observe
that the Whittle’s index policy with LLLP interchange and LLF achieve similar
performance, since both policies roughly follow the least laxity first principle.
The performance of these two policies is close to the performance upper bound.
The EDF policy perform poorly because it does not take the remaining charg-
ing demand into account. The gap between the Whittle’s index policy and the
Whittle’s index policy with LLLP interchange comes from the reordering of EVs
with positive laxity (cf. the discussion following Theorem 2).
Figure 3.5: Performance comparison: constant charging cost c[t] = 0.5,
Q(0, 0) = 0.3, T¯ = 12, j¯ = 9, β = 0.999, F( j) = 0.2 j2, N = 10.
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Figure 3.6: Performance comparison: constant charging cost c[t] = 0.5,
Q(0, 0) = 0.3, T¯ = 12, j¯ = 9, β = 0.999, F( j) = 0.2 j2, M/N = 0.5.
For the dynamic charging cost case, we use the real-time electricity price
signal from the California Independent System Operator (CAISO) and train a
Markovian model that describes the marginal charging costs (cf. Sections III
and V of [86]). Each time slot of the constructed Markov chain (on charging cost)
lasts for 1 hour. For each time slot, the real-time price is quantized into discrete
price states, and the transition probability (of the Markov chain) is simply the
frequency the price change from one state to another.
In Figure 3.7, we fix the EV traffic and the number of chargers N = 10 and
vary the power limit constraints. When the power limit is low and M/N is s-
mall, there is no enough power to finish all EVs and the penalty dominates the
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Figure 3.7: Performance comparison: stochastic charging cost,
Q(0, 0) = 0.3, T¯ = 12, j¯ = 9, β = 0.999, F( j) = 0.2 j2.
charging profit. In this case the performance of different policies is close since
the limited resource allows not much to do. When the power limit is adequate
and M/N = 1, all EVs can be finished on time. In this case, the Whittle’s index
policy solves the problem optimally and achieves the upper bound. The inter-
change does not happen because the LLLP principle is always satisfied in this
case. EDF and LLF do not consider the stochastic charging cost, thus they per-
form sub-optimal. When the power constraint is neither too tight (M/N ≈ 0)
nor too loose (M/N ≈ 1), LLLP can reduce the number of unfinished EVs with
large unfinished charging demand and therefore reduces the non-completion
penalties.
In Figure 3.8, we compare the performance of different policies by fixing the
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Figure 3.8: Performance comparison: stochastic charging cost, ρτi = 0.7,
T¯ = 12, j¯ = 9, β = 0.995, F( j) = 0.2 j2, M/N = 0.5.
power limit ratio M/N = 0.5 and vary the number of chargers N. Both EDF and
LLF seek to activate as many chargers as possible, up to the power constraint M.
The Whittle’s index policy, on the other hand, take the advantage of the pricing
fluctuation and charge more EVs at price valley and keeps chargers idle when
charging cost is high. Based on the Whittle’s index policy, the LLLP interchange
reduces the penalty of unfinished EVs and improves the performance of Whit-
tle’s index policy. The total reward achieved by the Whittle’s index with LLLP
interchange policy is more than 1.7 times of that obtained by EDF; the perfor-
mance gap between the Whittle’s index with LLLP interchange policy and the
LLF policy is over 25%. We also note that the LLLP principle improves Whittle’s
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index by around 10%.
3.6.1 Asymptotic optimality
In Figure 3.9, simulation results are presented to compare the performance
achieved by various heuristic policies and to validate the theoretic results es-
tablished in Lemma 1.
In this simulation, the arrival sequence within T¯ time slots follows a Poisson
process with mean M0.999. We fix the number of chargers N = 1000 and vary
the power limit M as a parameter. The dynamic cost evolves according to a
Markovian model that is trained using real-time electricity price signals from
CAISO. Each time slot of the constructed Markov chain lasts for 1 hour and the
entire simulation horizon lasts for 300 days (with 24 × 300 time slots).
The EDF and LLF policies do not take into account the dynamics of charging
costs, and their gap-to-optimality increases as both the EV arrival rate and pow-
er limit grow. On the other hand, the gap between the total rewards achieved
by the Whittle’s index policy and the optimal policy quickly decreases to zero
as the system scales.
3.7 Literature Review
The EV charging model considered in this chapter falls into the category of
deadline scheduling problems which is first considered by Liu and Layland [92].
The deadline scheduling problem, in its most generic setting, is the scheduling
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Figure 3.9: Comparison of the total rewards achieved by three different in-
dex policies under dynamic charging cost: Q(0, 0) = 0.3, T¯ = 12,
j¯ = 9, β = 0.999, F( j) = 0.2 j2, θ = 0.999, N = 1000.
of EVs with different workloads and deadlines for completion. Typically, there
are not enough processors to satisfy all the demand; the cost of processing may
vary with time, and unfinished jobs by their deadlines incur a penalty. In the
EV charging framework, each EV can be viewed as a job and the peak power
constraint gives the processing capacity.
There are in general two criterions to evaluate a policy, worst case analysis
and average case analysis. In the average case analysis, like what we present
in this chapter, the objective of a scheduling policy is to achieve a good per-
formance averaged over all possible scenarios of job arrivals, the states of jobs
and charging costs. The worst case analysis, on the other hand, focuses on the
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robustness of the algorithm. An algorithm achieves good performance on av-
erage can perform rather bad in some scenarios. The worst case analysis gives
an lower bound of the performance of algorithms and looks for algorithms with
optimal lower bound in any scenarios. In this section, we present some results
in both worst case and average case analysis.
3.7.1 Worst case analysis
Performance measure: competitive ratio
In the worst case analysis, the performance of an online policy pi is measured
by the competitive ratio against the optimal offline (clairvoyant) scheduler. The
offline scheduler has the information of future arrivals while an online policy
does not.
Define instance I as a sample path of the realization of the arrival, demand
and deadlines of EVs and other randomness. Denote the profit obtained by the
online (optimal offline) scheduler by Vpi(I) (V∗offline(I)) for some instance I. The
competitive ratio is defined as below:
Definition 5. Competitive ratio: An online policy pi is α-competitive if inf I Vpi(I)V∗offline(I)
≥ α
for all instance I ∈ I where I is the collection of all instances with finite number EVs.
For any instance, the performance of an α-competitive online algorithm is
guaranteed to be at least α fraction of the optimal offline algorithm. The objec-
tive is to find the online policy that is competitive to the optimal offline schedule
across all instances I ∈ I.
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Optimal online policies: M = 1
For the single processor case, the results are quite complete. When all EVs can be
finished on time, simple index algorithms (with linear complexity) such as the
earliest deadline first (EDF) [92, 31] and the least laxity first (LLF) [102] achieve
the same performance as the optimal off-line algorithm in the deterministic set-
ting. Recall that, EDF always
To apply the results in the EV charging, we consider a special case of what
is descried in Section. 3.1. Assume the parking capacity of the charging sta-
tion is arbitrarily large (N = ∞) but the power capacity can only support char-
ing one EV at any time (M = 1). The charging cost is assumed to be constant
(c[t] = c0 < 1) and the penalty of unfinished EV is simply linear in unfinished
demand F( j) = j. We set the discounted factor β = 1 and consider a finite num-
ber of EVs in each instance I so the value function Vpi(I) is well defined.
In this case, the charging cost c0 is constant and less than the unit time charg-
ing revenue 1. To maximize the charging profit, the scheduler needs to keep
charging if there is unfinished EV in the system. The simple online algorithm
EDF and LLF can finish charging all EVs if it is possible [31]. That is, both of
EDF and LLF achieves the competitive ratio equals to 1.
The proof of the optimality of EDF is intuitive. If there exists some schedule
algorithm pi that can finish all EVs before the deadlines, one can always trans-
form the policy pi into EDF by interchange EVs charging sequence that does not
follow the EDF principle while preserving the feasibility of the scheduling. As
illustrated in Figure 3.10, suppose policy pi charges J2 before J1 and d2 > d1. One
can interchange the charging of J1 and J2 and keep other charging sequence the
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same. Denote the policy after the interchange as pi′. We can see that pi′ is always
feasible since d2 > d1. If pi can finish charging all EVs before the deadlines, so
can pi′. One can keep doing the interchange till the charging sequence complete-
ly follows the EDF principle.
Figure 3.10: Interchange following EDF principle
The proof of the optimality of LLF is similar. As illustrated in Figure3.11,
suppose some policy pi can fully charge all EVs. Assume at time t, J1 has less
laxity than J2, d1 − j1 < d2 − j2, and pi charges J2 at time t rather than J1. We
first find t′, the first time pi charges J1 after t. We can interchange the charging
of J2 and J1 at time t and t′ and keep all other charging sequence the same as
pi and the feasibility is preserved. The interchange can always be made since
d1 − d2 < j1 − j2 < j1. The policy pi will not charge J1 after d2 for the first time.
Otherwise it can not finish charging J1 on time even if it spends all time from d2
to d1 on J1. The interchange can be carried out till no such EV pair that violates
the LLF principle can be found. Thus LLF can also finish all EVs if possible.
There is also a substantial literature on deadline scheduling with multiple
processors (M > 1) (for a survey, see [28]). It is shown in [32] that optimal on-
line scheduling policies do not exist in general for the worst case performance
measure.
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Figure 3.11: Interchange following LLF principle
3.7.2 Average case analysis
The literature on deadline scheduling in the average case analysis is less exten-
sive. Panwar, Towsley and Wolf in [105] and [138] made early contributions
in establishing the optimality of EDF in minimizing the unfinished work when
there is a single processor (M = 1), and the jobs (EVs) are non-preemptive. The
performance of EDF is quantified in the heavy traffic regime using a diffusion
model in [90, 35, 88].
The multiprocessor (M > 1) stochastic deadline scheduling problem is less
understood, primarily because the stochastic dynamic programming for such
problems are intractable to solve in practice. A particularly relevant class of
applications is scheduling in wireless networks where job (packets) arrival is
stochastic, and packets sometimes have deadlines for delivery. In [11], the au-
thor analyzed the performance of the EDF policy for packets delivery in tree
networks. In [112], the packets are assumed to arrive periodically or simultane-
ously and the Whittle’s index policy is applied. Related problems of scheduling
packets with deadlines in ad hoc networks are studied in [70].
The work closest to our problem in this chapter is [53] where the deadline
scheduling problem with processing capacity is formulated as an RMAB prob-
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lem and the indexability is established. There are, however, several important
differences between [53] and our case. First, in [53], the arrivals are simultane-
ous. In our case, the arrival is random. Second, the constant processing profit
is assumed in [53] while in our case the processing profit (charging cost) is s-
tochastic.
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CHAPTER 4
EV CHARGING FOR VEHICLE TO GRID SERVICES
Electric Vehicles can also perform a variety of functions related to the stabili-
ty and efficient operation of the grid (collectively referred to as Vehicle-to-Grid,
or V2G), and to be remunerated for their cooperation. Factoring these cooper-
ation and remuneration structures into the charging problem of the EVs adds a
degree of computational complexity, while also Requiring the creation of a new
framework for revenue-sharing from the provision of these services given that
the EV faces degradation costs and other potential inconvenience. In this chap-
ter, we will first go over the proposed uses of EVs for V2G and studies about
their economic viability (§4.1). We discuss incorporating demand-response and
load-shifting (§4.2), and frequency-regulation (§4.3) in the scheduling problem.
4.1 Literature Review
Vehicle-to-Grid, or V2G, refers collectively to the provision of energy and an-
cillary services from an EV to the grid [131]. The former encompasses the use
of EVs as distributed storage and to shift load, while the latter encompasses
the provision of a range of services, such as frequency regulation and voltage
control, to the grid.
4.1.1 EVs as distributed storage and load-shifting agents
Electric vehicles can be used as distributed storage by the grid to store renew-
able energy and to shift peak demand [79]. Vehicles are only utilized 4% of the
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time [79], leading to their potential use for grid-scale storage. However, this
use is envisioned for large numbers of aggregated vehicles given the amount
of storage required to have a significant effect on the grid load, and thus it will
have a secondary effect on the uptake of electric vehicles [81]. Furthermore, this
additional use of EV batteries leads to degradation of the batteries, and thus
the benefit of this additional storage has to be weighed against the cost of this
wear-and-tear. In simulation studies, the net annual benefit of this load-shifting
versus the cost of battery degradation, even with a priori perfect market infor-
mation, is shown to be $10− 120 per EV [108], which pales in comparison to the
cost of an EV battery.
4.1.2 EVs as ancillary service providers
The Federal Energy Regulatory Committee (FERC) has defined ancillary ser-
vices as “those services necessary to support the transmission of electric power
. . . to maintain reliable operations of the interconnected transmission system”
[24]. FERC has identified 6 types of possible ancillary services [24], but their
implementation and availability depends on jurisdictions and ISOs (e.g., [113]).
In particular, the charging of fleets of EVs has been envisioned as a potential
contributor to unit commitment [123, 122] and loss reduction in the distribution
system [134]. However, these effects are only noticeable once there is a large e-
nough coordinated population of EVs. The most well-studied ancillary services
to be provided by EVs are those provided on shorter time scales: frequency
regulation and spinning reserves [79, 81, 130, 131, 142, 74, 61].
Frequency control encompasses the actions taken to ensure that the grid fre-
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quency remains within a range of the nominal frequency, 60 Hz [113]. This
process generally involves three levels of control, which are distinguished by
their time-frame and where the action is taken [113]. Frequency regulation oc-
curs through a real-time signal sent by the grid operator that calls for either a
positive or a negative correction. Regulation typically occurs on an hourly basis
and involves dispatch on time-frames of 4 seconds to 1 minute [81]. Typically,
market participants contracted for frequency regulation are remunerated based
on the amount of capacity available per-hour, with a smaller portion of payment
to follow based on actual use of the resources [81]. Providing spinning reserves,
however, requires maintaining synchronization with the grid and the ability to
provide power immediately. These reserves are called upon during unplanned
system events that occur 20-50 times a year [81] and their providers are remu-
nerated based on both their availability and the used capacity. Frequency regu-
lation has been shown to be the most economically beneficial avenue for EVs to
participate in V2G markets [79, 81, 146, 142].
However, the total demand for frequency regulation is shown to be fulfilled
by the participation of a relatively small number of EVs [6, 81], and thus the
profit from participating in this market will decrease with the increasing pen-
etration of EVs. After the large adoption of EVs, participation in load shifting
would be another major benefit of EV owners.
4.2 Load Shifting
The lack of cost-effective storage makes the power grid inefficient dealing with
the fluctuating demand. The annualy demand peak usually happens in the
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summer. Without local energy storage, a large number of reserve generators
and transmission lines are needed. The peak typically only lasts a few hun-
dred hours, necessitating a large investment for the marginal capacity that can
be ameliorated by spreading out delay-tolerant load over time. Single purpose
battery storage facilities have not been proven economical except in niche ap-
plication such as delaying a distribution system upgrade. However, the V2G
service of EVs supplies a dual purpose storage resource which has provoked
great interest. Numerous studies have shown the ability of EV charging to re-
shape the demand profile or even move the peak period [59, 127].
One of problems of traditional storage is the huge initial capital cost. Howev-
er, this problem is naturedly circumvented by the adoption of EVS. The battery
of EVs is purchased for driving and the initial capital cost is not assigned to the
off-vehicle electricity use. Besides the initial capital cost, the load shaving effect
of V2G services also reduces the ramping reserves which usually come at great
economic and environment cost.
The authors of [107] perform an economic analysis of a single EV owner
participating the load shifting V2G service. The consumer is assumed to know
the future electricity price and the battery is assumed to be able to discharge and
sell the energy back to the grid. The objective function is to maximize the profit
of energy arbitrage taking into account battery degradation. The economic test
is carried out using different electricity price scenarios. The result suggests that
the economic incentive for EV to participate in the energy arbitrage is small due
to the small variation in LMPs and the small battery capacity.
A similar analysis is presented in [43]. The authors shift the charging of a
single EV to achieve different objectives such as minimizing the charging cost
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and maximizing the use of renewable energy. The results show that the benefit
strongly depends on the accuracy of predictions of price and renewables.
The load shifting of large scale EVs problem is considered in [135] with net-
work constraints from the view point of an aggregator. The aggregator has di-
rect control of multiple EVs and distributed generators. The objective is to min-
imize the day-ahead operation cost of the system while satisfying the network
constraints, generation limits and the requests of EV charging. A three segments
model of EV batteries is considered and the problem is formulated as a mixed-
integer linear program (MILP) where the control variables are the output of the
generators and the charge/discharge rate of EVs. Case studies are carried out
using real network parameters.
4.3 Frequency Regulation
The flexibility inherent to EV charging makes EVs a good candidate to partic-
ipate in the frequency regulation market. In the frequency regulation market,
cleared participants (in the day-ahead ancillary services market) are given reg-
ulation signals to follow at the operating time along with payments associat-
ed with up-regulating or down-regulating at the ISOs request. Note that even
EV chargers that cannot supply power back to the grid (e.g., due to grid trans-
formers not supporting bi-directional energy flow) can accomplish both actions
by changing their consumption patterns. The charger’s goal in this setting is
to charge EVs up to their desired level while minimizing the expected cost of
charging, factoring in possible payments from the ISO for providing frequency
regulation services. Given that a participant in the regulation market needs to
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have the flexibility to accommodate unpredictable regulation signals at charging
time, it is reasonable to assume that charging aggregators that operate multiple
charger will be participants in the regulation markets, which typically occur a
day ahead of charging time, with real time adjustments being made by EVs in
response to signals sent by the aggregator that seeks to meet its obligations. We
will examine these two problems in turn: we first focus on the problem of the
aggregator that has to bid in the day-ahead market, and then focus on the prob-
lem of an EV that has to charge in real-time given regulation signals passed on
by the aggregator, two problems that can be shown to be somewhat decoupled.
4.3.1 Large Scale EV Charging with Ancillary Service
The participation of public charging stations in the provision of ancillary ser-
vices has been widley studied [132, 73, 148]. Naturally, the charging station
has two related mathematical problems, divided into day-ahead and real-time
stages by the time at which the decision has to be finalized.
In the day-ahead market, as all participants, the charging station submits the
ancillary service bids to the ISO. The ancillary service bids consist of an expected
demand curve for the coming day and an adjustment range within which the
charging station promises to be able to adjust the power consumption. The
ISO collects all the bids from the participants and decides who are selected to
provide ancillary service by clearing the market.
In the real-time market, the ISO distributes the real-time electricity price and
the regulation signal for each selected participant. The participants are asked to
adjust the power consumption to follow the regulation signal. The revenue of
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Figure 4.1: Charging station participating demand response.
the ancillary service is computed by the range of the adjustment and the accura-
cy and the speed of the response. The EV charging problem is more complicated
in this case since the charging station needs to deal with the randomness from
the EV arrivals, as well as the stochastic regulation signal.
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4.3.2 Ancillary Service Bidding
Here we formulate the most general problem of the charging station. In this for-
mulation, the charging station revenue comes from three sources. These sources
are charging revenue collected from EV consumers RCh (usually assumed pro-
portional to the charging energy or time), the revenues from selling regulation
and responsive reserves capacity RAS, and the possible revenues from selling
energy to the grid REn. The charging cost may include the wholesale cost of
energy which is delivered to the EVs and the battery degradation associated
with discharging. The bidding and the scheduling problem of the charging s-
tation is to maximize the profit subject to physical constraints and consumer
requirements which may include but are not limited to battery capacity limits,
consumer-defined minimum SOC by departure,and system loading limits.
The realized dispatch of energy in the real-time subject to the ancillary ser-
vice signal is stochastic and unknown at bidding time. One intuitive way to
deal with the randomness is to formulate the bidding problem in the day-ahead
market as a linear programming based on the expected regulation signals [132].
The control variables include the preferred charging profile ui(t) of EV i, the up-
regulation capacity u+i (t), the down-regulation capacity u
−
i (t), and the reduction
in power draw available for spinning reserves uSRi (t). The expected power con-
sumption is stated as follows.
Eui(t) = ui(t) + u+i (t)Ep
+ − u−i (t)Ep− − uSRi (t)EpSR
where Ep+ is the expected percentage of up-regulation capacity dispatched each
time, Ep− the expected percentage of down-regulation capacity, and EpSR the
expected percentage of responsive reserve capacity.
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The optimization problem is formulated as follows.
maxui(t),u+i (t),u−i (t),uSRi (t)
RCh + RAS + REn −∑i ∑t c(t)Eui(t) −CDeg
Subject to Charging capacity constraints
Customer-defined minimum SOC limits
Power constraints
(4.1)
where:
• the charging revenue is the charging price times the charging energy
RCh = p
∑
i
∑
t Eui(t),
• the revenue of selling energy back to the grid equals to the energy price
times the energy delivered to the grid REn =
∑
t pEn(t)
∑
i Eui(t)1(Eui(t) < 0),
• and CDeg the battery degradation cost.
If the ancillary service revenue is measured linearly in terms of the up and
down-regulation range and the spinning reserve capacity, the problem is a linear
program. The expected demand curve and the regulation range are thus the
sum of expected power consumption
∑
i Eui(t) and the sum of regulation ranges
of each EV.
This formulation assumes that the charging facility has perfect prediction
of electricity price, ancillary service price, and driving pattern of customers.
Advanced machine learning algorithms and smart phone applications may help
to improve the predictions. However, a study of the impacts of the forecasting
errors is lacking.
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4.3.3 Real-time Scheduling
When scheduling the real-time EV charging, the charging facility needs to deal
with the difference between the prediction made in the day-ahead planning
and the realization of the regulation signal and the charging demand. Sever-
al approaches are proposed to adjust the planned charging profile. In [132], the
amount of power adjustment required by the ISO is distributed to EVs propor-
tional to the adjustment range u+, u−, uSR. In [73], authors investigated the real-
time adjustment balancing the deviation from the planned charging trajectories
and the error of dispatch signal tracking.
A “priority” policy of large-scale EV charging participating the ancillary ser-
vice program is proposed in [148]. Following the formulation in Chapter 5, the
scheduler does not require the prediction of electricity price, ancillary service
dispatch signal, EV charging demand in the real-time scheduling. Under the
framework illustrated in Figure 4.1, following assumptions are approximations
of the practical operating conditions and made for tractable analytical develop-
ments.
A1. Each charger can be connected to only one EV, and it is removed from the
EV at the deadline di.
A2. An EV is charged at a fixed rate normalized to 1 and can not be discharged
[60].
A3. The EV arrivals to the N chargers are independent and identically dis-
tributed (i.i.d.).
A4. The price of charging collected from consumers is proportion to the charg-
ing demand, normalized to 1 dollar/hour.
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A5. The marginal charging cost c[t] is an exogenous finite state Markov chain
whose evolution is independent of the state evolution and actions of
charging.
A6. The charging of EVs is preemptive without cost.
A7. The penalty for incomplete charging is a convex function of the incomplete
amount at the deadline.
A8. The dispatch signal M[t] is stochastic and independent from the actions of
the charging facility.
The state transition and charging reward of each EV are the same as defined
in (3.1) and (3.2). The charging profit collected from the EVs is stated as
RCh(S [t], ~a[t]) ,
N∑
i=1
Rai[t](S i[t], c[t]).
Based on the new rule of demand response market [110], the frequency reg-
ulation credit includes the capacity payment and performance payment. The
former one is simply the regulation amount times the regulation price per unit.
The performance payment is measured by the tracking accuracy of the regula-
tion signal. The accuracy as defined in PJM ancillary service market is stated as
(1−|∑Ni=1 ai[t]−M[t]|/M[t]) [109], where M[t] is the regulation signal and ∑Ni=1 ai[t]
the extra power usage.
The frequency regulation credit collected from the ISO at time t is stated as
follows.
RAS(S [t], ~a[t]) , A[t](1 − |
N∑
i=1
ai[t] − M[t]|/M[t]) + B[t],
where A[t] and B[t] take account of the stochastic demand response price and
capacity credit.
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The charging rate of each EV is assumed fixed and the action is reduced to
binary variables: charging/idle. Thus the dispatch signal M[t] is quantized into
the number EVs that are simultaneously being charged.
Given the initial system state S [0] = s and a policy pi that determines a se-
quence of actions a[t], t = 0, 1, · · · , the expected discounted system reward is
defined by
Vpi(s)
∆
=Epi
 ∞∑
t=0
βt[RCh(S [t], ~a[t]) + RAS(S [t], ~a[t])]
∣∣∣∣∣∣S [0] = s
 (4.2)
where Epi is the conditional expectation for given scheduling policy pi and
0 < β < 1 the discount factor.
The random regulation signal and regulation price introduce extra complex-
ity. One intuitive way is to model the tracking of the signal as a constraint on
number of active arms and to maximize the charging rewards. The stochastic
dynamic programming in () can be viewed as a restless MAB problem that, at
each time t, exactly M[t] out of N chargers (arms) are active. The optimization
problem is state as follows.
suppi Epi
{∑∞
t=0
∑N
i=1 β
tRai[t](S˜ i[t]) | S˜ i[0]
}
subject to
∑N
i=1 ai[t] = M[t], ∀t.
(4.3)
Similar to Chapter 3, a heuristic policy, the Whittle’s index policy with LLLP
interchange, is proposed as illustrated in Algorithm 2.
The proposed policy tries the best to follow the regulation signal and takes
the advantage of time varying charging cost while balancing the risk of non-
completion penalties. In principle, it gives higher priority to EVs with tight
deadlines and large remaining demand to avoid potential penalties.
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Algorithm 2: Whittle Index with LLLP interchange
1. Calculate the Whittle’s index of all EVs and sort them in a descend order.
2. Apply LLLP inter-change to the sorted EVs.
3. Activate the M[t] EVs with highest priority. If there are not enough avail-
able EVs in the station, activate as many as possible.
Note that the proposed algorithm does not guarantee the feasibility of (4.3).
However, the heuristic itself always works. If there are not enough EVs with
positive charging demand in the system, the algorithm simply charges as many
EVs as possible to try best tracking the regulation signal.
4.3.4 Participation of EVs in the Frequency Regulation Market
The provision of frequency regulation services is remunerated by the grid based
on capacity rather than actual dispatched energy, as the fluctuations required
by the grid are evenly distributed around zero [14]. This means that given the
fluctuations in the availability of EVs and the need for forward contracts (e.g.,
commitment to providing frequency regulation service in the day-ahead mar-
ket), the presence of an aggregator is needed to coordinate the participation of
populations of EVs in the frequency regulation market. The aggregator then
commits to providing regulation services to the grid for a specific time period
through a contract. At operation time, when the aggregator receives a regula-
tion signal, it can call upon available, idle EVs to supply the required power by
incentivizing them by passing along a scaled portion of the payment received
from the grid for the service.
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Since regulation service is only provided by idle EVs (i.e., those not being
charged in that time instance), thus the participation of a single EV in frequency
regulation can be decoupled from the problem of the aggregator, and its charg-
ing schedule can be captured in the same framework as off-line charging given
advance knowledge of the regulation price [118, 61].
The decision on whether to participate in the frequency regulation market
in each time period will be a function of the state of charge of the EV at that
time-frame, as well as its availability in the charging station. Thus, the opti-
mal charging and participation decision can be folded into the same Markov
Decision Process framework [118] that can be solved numerically.
Without the frequency regulation decision, the optimal schedule computa-
tion laid out in §2.3.1 involved finding the least-costly feasible schedule:
min0≤−→u≤−→¯u
∑T
t=1Ct(
∑M
i=1 ui[t]). (4.4)
Notice that the cost of charging in this context depends on the total charging
profile at each time. Since energy used to charge by a single EV is negligible
compared to the grid, one can assume that in formulating the single EV prob-
lem, Ct(x) = C[t]x is a reasonable assumption (i.e., the fluctuations in the price of
power are independent of the consumption of a single EV).
Furthermore, the aggregator will provide a financial incentive for the EV to
regulate their charging up or down to track the regulation signal given by the
grid when they are not being charged. Therefore, there will be an additional
term in the objective of each EV that will incorporate the possible pay-off they
can achieve from tracking the regulation requirement of the aggregator.
Thus, if TC is defined to be the set of times in T = {1, . . . ,T } at which the EV
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is being charged, the remuneration structure for participation in the regulation
market will apply for T\TC, so the total remuneration becomes:
min0≤−→u≤−→¯u
∑T
t=1C(t)u(t) −
∑
t∈T\TC CR(t)
= −∑Tt=1CR(t) + ∑t∈TC (CR(t) +C(t)u(t)). (4.5)
whereCR(t) is the scaled remuneration for provision of regulation service at time
t ∈ T\TC. For a single EV, and without strict charging bounds, it is easy to see
that an optimal solution exists such that u(t) only takes values {0, u¯} for all but at
most one t ∈ TC using a replacement argument, as a linear function of a bounded
variable is maximized at one of the bounds. The implication, as foreshadowed
in §2.3.1, is that for a reasonably large number of time-increments, the optimal
schedule will only consist of periods of charging at the maximal rate and periods
of idleness. Therefore, the charging action-space has only two values, making
the problem suitable to a dynamic programming framework.
This simplified framework, however, does not explicitly consider the charg-
ing limits of batteries. In the real world, for example, a fully charged EV cannot
provide up-regulation to the grid, as it does not have the means to charge even
more, and vice versa. One solution to this problem that has been proposed [61]
is to differentiate between the up-regulation and down-regulation signal in the
remuneration structure, replacing CR(t) with CRU(t)WRU(s(t)) + CRD(t)WRD(s(t)),
where s(t) is the state of charge of the EV at time t, CRU(t) and CRD(t) are the
up and down regulation prices offered by the aggregator (potentially equal),
and WRU(·) (respectively, WRD(·)) is a weight function that is equal to 1 when
EV charge is far away from its upper (respectively, lower) limit, and decreas-
es linearly to 0 with EV charge as the EV increases (decreases) to its maximum
(minimum) level. This essentially eliminates the benefit of participating in up-
regulation services when the EV is fully charged, and participating in down-
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regulation when the EV has an empty battery, and thus makes the final policy
implementable. The final step of the process involves pinning the final state
of charge of the EV (at departure time) to the desired amount, and solving the
resulting Markov Decision Process, e.g., using backward induction.
The savings from participating in this market have been estimated to be on
the order of $600 per EV per year [118] even with uni-directional flows that
would not require upgrades to the distribution system.
Numerical Results
In this section, numerical experiments are conducted to compare the perfor-
mance of different scheduling policies with demand response options in the
real-time. One intuitive trajectory tracking algorithm is proposed in [73], which
minimizes a trade off between the tracking errors of a predetermined charging
trajectory for each vehicle (determined in a day-head optimization like (4.1))
and the deviation from the regulation signal. In the simulation, Algorithm 2
with constant dispatch signal M[t] = M is applied to generate a planned charg-
ing trajectory for each charger. After that, the dispatch signal is generated by a
uniform distribution with mean M. Since the result of the convex programming
in [73] is continuous, the binary charging action is generated by Bernoulli ran-
dom variables with the results of the convex programming as the probability
coefficients.
Figure 4.2 shows an example of regulation signal tracking performance of
different policies. When the constraint is feasible, the Whittle’s index policy
with LLLP interchange always perfectly matches the regulation signal. While,
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the trajectory tracking policy deviates from the regulation signal slightly due to
the difference between the predetermined charging trajectory and the regulation
signal.
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Figure 4.2: Regulation signal tracking: M = 50, 10% regulation capacity.
The impact of the regulation range on tracking accuracy and charging re-
wards is illustrated in Figure 4.3. As the range increases, the tracking error of
trajectory tracking policy increases while Whittle Index policy with and with-
out LLLP improvement matches the regulation signal perfectly. For the charg-
ing reward, the trajectory tracking algorithm does not consider the state of EVs
and the electricity price. The performance in charging reward is worse than
Whittle’s index. Meanwhile, LLLP improves the Whittle’s index policy in the
charging reward collected from EV consumers and thus makes more profit.
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CHAPTER 5
MARKET DYNAMICS AND INDIRECT NETWORK EFFECTS IN
ELECTRIC VEHICLE DIFFUSION
As discussed in Chapter 1, both the electric vehicles and the charging station-
s embrace a rapid development in the past decade. The growth trends of EVs
and EVCSs have strong temporal and geographic couplings as shown in Fig-
ure 5.1. This is the ”cluster” phenomenon of alternative fuel vehicles discussed
in [144], which is the first article to discuss the network effects between the al-
ternative fuel vehicles and the fueling infrastructure. Consumers’ EV adoption
in the EV market is affected by the availability of EV charging stations whereas
the level of EVCS investment strongly depends on the size of EV stock. Thus ar-
eas with a lower cost to adopt charging stations will attract more EVs and more
EVs incentivize the investors to build more charging stations.
(a) EV stock per million people. (b) Public charging stations per million
people.
Figure 5.1: EVs and public charging stations in Metropolitan Statistical Ar-
eas in 2015 [67].
The reason behind the growth of the EV market, or the lack of it, is multi-
faceted. The growth is driven partially by the increasing awareness of the en-
vironmental impacts of gasoline vehicles, superior designs and performance of
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some EVs, and, by no small measure, subsidies in the form of tax credits provid-
ed by the federal and state governments. However, the EV industry faces stiff
skepticism due to the high purchase cost of EVs, the limited driving range, the
long charging time, and the lack of public charging facilities.
The manufacturer’s suggested retail price (MSRP) of the 2016 Nissan Leaf,
Ford Focus Electric, and Chevrolet Volt are $34200, $29170, and $25670, respec-
tively, which are more than $10000 above the purchase price of comparable
gasoline vehicles, such as Nissan Sentra, Ford Focus, and Chevrolet Cruze. To
make EVs equally attractive as internal-combustion vehicles, federal and state
governments provide a tax credit subsidy up to $7500 for each purchase of EVs.
Meanwhile, the cost of electric vehicle batteries, which is the major cost of elec-
tric vehicles, has been reduced by more than 65% since 2010. It is projected
that, by 2020, EVs will become more economic than internal-combustion vehi-
cles even without government subsidies [2]. Besides the quick drop of the bat-
tery cost, the low operation cost of EVs also significantly offsets the high capital
cost [40].
The limited driving range of EVs, however, restricts the adoption significant-
ly. By 2016, Nissan Leaf has an range of 107 miles after a full charge, comparing
with the range of 99 miles of Ford Focus Electric and 53 electric miles of Chevro-
let Volt. While the gasoline vehicles can easily achieve a driving range of over
400 miles per tank of gas. The anxiety of running out of electricity makes the
EV charging infrastructure and charging time important considerations when
consumers choose vehicles.
This chapter provides an analytical study on indirect network effects in the
EV market. In particular, we formulate a sequential game for the two-sided
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market and address analytically and numerically the following questions: how
does the EV adoption interact with EVCS investment? How do indirect network
effects affect market dynamics? What are the implications of indirect network
effects on the public policy?
A perfect and complete sequential game model for the two-sided EV-EVCS
market with an investor as the leader and each consumer a follower is intro-
duced. Through profit maximization, the investor decides whether to build
EVCSs at sites chosen (optimally) from a list of candidate sites or to defer his
investment with earned interest. The candidate sites are heterogeneous; each
site may have a different favorability rating and different capital costs. The op-
timal investment decision also includes the optimal pricing of charging services.
Observing investor’s decision which defines the locations of EVCSs and the
charging prices, a consumer decides whether to purchase an EV or a gasoline
alternative. If the choice is an EV, the consumer also decides the preferred charg-
ing service.
We provide a solution to the sequential game that includes the optimal deci-
sions for the consumers and the investor. A random utility maximization (RUM)
model [99] with two different distributions of the consumer vehicle preference
is considered.
Under the assumption that the consumer vehicle preference has the type
I extreme value distribution, we show that the optimal purchasing decision
is a threshold policy on the difference of vehicle preferences of the consumer.
A closed-form expression for the EV market share ηe is obtained, where ηe is
a function of the EV purchasing price, the investor’s decisions on the num-
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ber/locations of charging stations, and the charging prices at those locations.
The obtained closed-form solution allows us to examine how the investor’s de-
cisions and the cost of EVs affect the overall EV market share.
To obtain the optimal investment decision, we first study the optimal op-
eration decision of the investor by fixing the set of EVCS sites. We show that
the optimal pricing for EV charging at these sites is such that profits generated
from these sites are equal. We show further that the optimal pricing increases
logarithmically with the density of EV charging sites.
The optimal decision on choosing which EVCS sites to build (or deferring
investment) is more complicated and is combinatorial in nature. We provide
a greedy heuristic and show that the heuristic is asymptotically optimal as the
density of EVCS sites increases.
Under the assumption of the uniform vehicle preference, similar results are
also obtained. The optimal purchasing decision of a consumer is again a thresh-
old policy on the vehicle preference. There is, however, a dead zone effect of
the EVCS density. Specifically, when the density of EVCSs is lower than some
threshold, the EV market share is zero.
5.1 Literature Review
There is an extensive literature on two-sided markets and indirect network ef-
fects for various products; see e.g., the compact disc (CD) player and CD title
markets [49], the video game console and video game markets [23, 25, 154], the
hardware and software markets [36], the credit card market [7], and the yellow
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page and advertisement markets [121]. Previous work on indirect network ef-
fects dates back to early theoretical studies such as [116, 78, 42]. Rochet and
Tirole [114] firstly proposed a restrictive definition to distinguish between one-
sided and two-sided markets in the context of charge per usage. Caillaud and
Jullien [17] pointed out that, one side of the market always waits for the action
from the other side. It is thus critical for players to take the right move during
the initial stages of the product diffusion.
Exploratory researches on the diffusion of vehicles with alternative fuel-
s have been conducted. Surveys were carried out to study the consumer at-
tributes on conventional vehicles and plug-in EVs in [85, 111, 89, 30]. The role
of consumer environmental awareness and signaling in the market for tradition-
al hybrid vehicles is examined in [75, 76] and [126]. The impacts of government
programs both at the federal and state level in promoting the adoption of hy-
brid vehicles are examined in recent studies, including [9, 46] and [124]. On the
other hand, Bunch et al. [15] established and estimated a nested multinomial
logit model for the clean-fuel vehicles demand. Similar discrete decision model
of vehicle is used in [41, 50, 64, 58] to study the preference of hybrid electric
vehicle. It is pointed out that charging convenience is a major concern when
consumers make the purchase but no analytical result of impact of EV market
performance on EVCS investment is presented.
There is a growing literature on the EVCS investment from the operation re-
search and engineering perspectives. For example, the charging station deploy-
ment has been formulated as an optimization problem from the social planner’s
point of view in [128, 45, 63, 21]. A location competition problem of charging
stations is considered in [10], where a discrete decision model of charging sta-
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tions similar to this chapter is used. Efficient design of large scale charging is
presented in [20] and the competition of charging operations is considered in
[19].
There is a rich literature on externalities in the new technology market
[69, 38, 8, 13, 101]. Jaffe and Stavins [69] examine the energy efficient technolo-
gies in buildings and suggest that energy paradox could be driven by a host of
factors such as the information problem and unobserved costs of new technolo-
gies. Economides [38] points out that the network externality is often observed
in non-network industries that the value of a unit of good increases with the
number of units sold. Arthur [8] examines the outcomes of two competing new
technologies under various conditions and shows that the new technology mar-
ket gradually lock itself into an outcome that is not entirely predictable in ad-
vance. Bresnahan and Greenstein [13] characterize the equilibrium and strategic
behavior within each segment of the computer industry and explain the dramat-
ic change of the market in 1990s. More closely related to our problem is Meyer
and Winebrake [101] which is the first articles to explore the indirect network
effects between alternative fuel vehicles and refueling stations. The multino-
mial logit model of vehicle choice considered in Meyer and Winebrake [101] is
similar to the consumer vehicle choice model in this chapter. However, Meyer
and Winebrake [101] consider only the consumer vehicle choice without model-
ing the investment decision on refueling stations and provide simulation results
under various scenarios. This chapter focuses on the EV market and provides
a theoretical analysis that simultaneously models the two-sides of the market:
consumer adoption of EVs and investment decision of charging stations.
The work of Li et al. [91] and Yu et al. [152] represent the first analysis of the
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two-sided EV and EVCS market and the related indirect network effects. The
work in [91] focuses on an empirical study of indirect network effects whereas
[152] focuses on the theoretical analysis. In particular, [152] extends the model
in [151] by allowing (unobserved) vehicle preferences to have a type I extreme
value distribution consistent with the discrete choice model [100]. Also new in
[152] are the comparison between the market solution and the decisions of the
social planner and the effects of subsidies for EV purchase and EVCS invest-
ments.
This chapter is organized as follows. The structure of the two-sided market
and a sequential game model are described in Section 5.2. The solution to the
game is obtained by backward induction. In Section 5.3, the consumers’ mod-
el and the optimal decisions are obtained. The investor’s model and optimal
strategy are presented in Section 5.4, as well as the social welfare optimization.
Discussions about different effects of subsidies and the difference between the
private market solution and the socially optimal solution are presented in Sec-
tion 5.5.
5.2 A Sequential Game Model
In this section, we formulate the two-sided market as a two-player sequential
game model with perfect and complete information. We introduce the basic
structure of the EV-EVCS market, define the players of the game, and specify
the decision process.
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5.2.1 Two-sided market structure
A two-sided market typically has a structure as illustrated in Figure 5.2, where
we use a generic hardware-software market as an example to describe its ba-
sic components. A two-sided market includes a set of platforms, say, Mac-
book™ and the OS X operating system as a hardware-software platform by
Apple Inc. vs. Dell’s Inspiron™ and the Windows 8 as an alternative.
Figure 5.2: The structure of a two-sided market.
On the one side of the platforms is the consumer who makes her purchase
decisions based on her platform preferences, the costs of the platforms, and the
available softwares for different platforms. On the other side of the platforms
are the software developers who invest in developing softwares for one partic-
ular platform or multiple platforms. The software developer makes his decision
based on, among other factors, the costs of developing softwares and the popu-
larity of platforms.
In Figure. 5.3, we present the two-sided EV market. There are two platform-
s: one is the EV as the “hardware” and the EVCS as the “software”. The other
is the conventional gasoline vehicle as the “hardware” and the gas station as
the “software”. On the one side of the platforms are the consumers who de-
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cide which type of vehicles to purchase based on the cost of EVs, the available
charging stations, and the cost of charging. On the other side of the platforms
is an investor who decides to build and operate charging stations or to defer his
investment and earn interest at a fixed rate1.
Figure 5.3: The two-sided market model of EVs and EVCSs.
5.2.2 The investor’s decision model
We assume that the investor is both the builder and the operator of EVCSs. The
monopoly assumption is valid at the launch stage of EVCS market since the in-
vestment is mainly conducted by the EV manufactories or the government. The
investor’s decision has two components: the first is an investment decision on
whether to build EVCSs from a list of candidate sites or to defer his investmen-
t. The second is an operation decision on pricing the charging services at those
built locations. The type of the charging station to be built is another decision
1Because we focus on the early stage of EV diffusion in an environment that gas stations are
already well established, the alternative of EVCS investor is not building additional gas stations.
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component since the building cost of the charging stations are dramatically dif-
ferent and the cost of charging time is an important concern of consumers when
choosing charging service. In this chapter, we assume the charging rate of the
EVCSs is the level 2 charging, the dominant charging rate for the public charg-
ing stations on the market. The major concern of the DC fast charging is the
potential damage to the battery and its impact on the grid.
Let C = {s¯i = ( fi, c¯i), i = 1, · · · ,NL} be the set of candidate sites for charging s-
tations known to the investor. Site s¯i = ( fi, c¯i) has two attributes: the favorability
rating fi and the marginal operating cost2 c¯i. The favorability rating fi represents
the characteristics of charging stations. It may include but not limited to vari-
ations in accessibility and availability of ancillary services. Accessibility refers
to how easy it is for consumers to access the charging station and potentially
affects the volume of the passenger flow. A similar discussion is presented for
gas stations by Salop and Hotelling ([125, 66]). For example, a site at workplace
parking lots may be more attractive than a location that is less frequently visited
by consumers. Ancillary services refers to other services that a charging station
may provide such as vehicle repair and super markets. Kroger, the largest gro-
cery store owner of the U.S. has installed over 300 Level 2 and DC fast charging
stations in key markets over the country [56]. Walmart and Kohl’s also expand-
ed their charging stations [54, 55]. These public charging station locations are
also favored by EV owners since they can charge while shopping.
The operating cost c¯i may vary across stations because of different locational
marginal price of wholesale electricity, the labor cost and other cost components.
Given C and the utility functions of the consumer, the investor’s decision is
2The marginal cost ($/mile) here is marginal operating cost ($/kWh) normalized by EV effi-
ciency (miles/kWh).
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denoted by (C, ~ρ) ∈ 2C × R|C| where C ⊆ C is the set of locations selected to build
charging stations and ~ρ = (ρ1, · · · , ρ|C|) ∈ R|C| the vector of charging prices at the
built stations.
Assuming the consumer maximizes her utility, the investor chooses the in-
vestment sites and charging prices to maximize the investment profit within his
budget B. The investment optimization is stated as
maxC,~ρ Π(C, ~ρ) −∑|C|i=1 F (s¯i)
subject to
∑|C|
i=1 F (s¯i) ≤ B
(5.1)
where Π is the operational profit and F (s¯i) the building cost of station i.
5.2.3 The consumer’s decision model
The expected cost of owning and using an EV include the upfront capital cost
and the expected future operating cost. The capital costs vary between EVs and
gasoline cars reflecting different purchase costs of these two types of vehicles.
Our model defines the expected future operating cost to be a function of expect-
ed gasoline price for gasoline cars and a function of expected electricity prices
for EVs. The gasoline price can be thought of expected average gasoline price
in the future. In case that gasoline prices follow a random walk as suggested
by Anderson, Kellogg, Sallee [5], the benefit predictor of future gasoline prices
would be current gasoline price.
A consumer observes the investor’s decision on the location set of charging
stations C = {s1, · · · , sNE } and the charging price vector ~ρ = (ρ1, · · · , ρNE ) where
NE is the number of charging stations. The consumer first chooses the type of
vehicle to purchase. If the choice is an EV, the consumer also decides on the lo-
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cation of charging. The action of the consumer is given by {ν, k}where ν ∈ {E,G}
is the vehicle choice (either EVs or gasoline vehicles) and k ∈ {0, 1, · · · ,NE} the
preferred charging station. We include k = 0 for the home charging option. The
consumer chooses {ν, k} by maximizing the overall vehicle utility that includes
the charging utility for the EV purchase.
For the vehicle choice, we assume a widely adopted discrete choice model
with random utility functions [10]. The consumer utility model of purchasing a
vehicle is assumed as follows.
VE = β1E(UE) − β2pE + Φ + E
VG = β1E(UG) − β2pG + Φ + G
(5.2)
where UE is the (random) charging utility of consumer’s best choice defined in
(5.5), E(UE) the expected maximum charging utility, pE the price of an EV, Φ the
utility of owning a vehicle, and E a random vehicle preference of EV. Variables
E(UG), pG, and G are similarly defined for the gasoline vehicle.
The coefficient β1 captures the magnitude of the indirect network effects.
More charging stations provide potentially higher charging utility of consumer-
s, thus increases the utility of purchasing a electric vehicle. The charging utility
UE captures the operation cost and charging time cost of EVs. The price of elec-
tricity is much lower than the price of gasoline which makes the operation cost
of an EV much lower. However, the charging time cost of EVs offsets the ben-
efit. In the charging utility model described in (5.4), we explicitly consider the
effect of charging price. The charging time cost can be included by offsetting the
favorability rating fi by a constant since we are considering only level 2 charg-
ing. The coefficient β2 is the price elasticity of demand and captures consumer
price sensitivity. The preference E and G represents the consumer preference of
EVs and gasoline vehicles, including but not limited to quality and brand loy-
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alty, driving experience, awareness of environment [75, 76] and other demand
shocks.
This consumer model is flexible and can be either short-term (EV leasing)
or long-term (EV purchasing). In a framework of EV purchasing, the price pE
would be the purchasing cost of electric vehicles. The charging utility is calcu-
lated during the life time of an EV. In a framework of EV leasing, the price pE
would be the leasing cost of electric vehicles, for example, for three years, the
duration of a typical leasing contract
The consumer’s decision is then defined by
max{VE,VG}. (5.3)
The optimization of consumer’s vehicle decision also includes optimally
choosing charging stations. Specifically, the consumer charging utility at sta-
tion i is assumed to be random in the following form.
Ui = α1 fi − α2ρi + i, i = 0, . . . ,NE (5.4)
where fi is the favorability rating, ρi the charging price determined by the in-
vestor, i the random preference of charging station i. The coefficient α2 indicates
the price sensitivity of the charging price of consumers.
Given the realization of the charging preference, ~ = (0, . . . , NE ), the EV own-
er chooses charging station k ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,NE} to maximize her charging utility, i.e.,
UE = max
k∈{0,...,NE }
Uk. (5.5)
For the option of choosing a gasoline vehicle, the number/locations of gas sta-
tions will not change with the investor’s decisions. Thus the expected maximum
fueling utility, E(UG), is a constant.
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The indirect network effect between the EV market and the EV charging
station market is reflected by the investment decision of the investor and the
charging utility UE. A shock to the system, for example a tax credit, would
stimulate the sale of EVs, which will bring more profit to the charging stations
and attract the investor to build more charging services. In the other hand, more
charging stations make the charging more convenient and result in a greater
charging utility UE. When β1 is statistically significant, more consumers will
choose to purchase an EV. The impact would circle back and forth between the
decisions of consumers and the investor and form a positive feedback loop in
both sides of the market [91].
5.2.4 The sequential game model
The sequential game structure of the two-sided EV-EVCS market is summarized
as follows.
• The investor’s decision is defined by the optimization in (5.1). Specifical-
ly, given the set of locations, C , the investor decides to invest (build and
operate) charging stations at a subset C ⊆ C and determines the charging
price ~ρ. When C = ∅, the investor defers his investment and earns interest
at a fixed rate.
• The consumer’s decision is defined by (5.3-5.5). Specifically, having ob-
served the investor’s decision, {C, ~ρ}, the consumer chooses ν ∈ {E,G}. If
ν = E, the consumer also chooses charging stations to charge by maximiz-
ing her charging utility.
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The dynamic game is solved by backward induction. In particular, we first
consider the consumer’s decision by fixing the investor’s choice of charging
locations and charging prices. The optimal consumer’s decision is given in Sec-
tion 5.3. In Section 5.4, the optimal investor’s decision is presented.
5.3 Consumer Decisions
5.3.1 Consumer Decision Model and Assumptions
We first summarize the assumptions of the consumer model given in Sec-
tion 5.2.3.
A1. Consumers are identical and their decisions are statistically independent.
Without loss of generality, we focus on the decision of a single consumer.
A2. The average charging demand is normalized to 1.
A3. The random preference of charging station i, i, is independent and iden-
tically distributed (IID) and follows the type I extreme value distribution
with the probability density function (PDF)
f () = e−e−e
−
.
A4. The random preference of vehicles E and G are statistically independent.
The type I extreme value distribution is widely used in the discrete choice
model. McFadden firstly introduced it in the consumer choice theory and
showed it leads to the multinomial logit distribution across choices [100].
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5.3.2 Consumer Decisions and EV Market Share
The main result in this section is the structure of the optimal vehicle decision
and the characterization of the EV market share as shown in the following the-
orem.
Theorem 6 (Consumer choice and EV market share). 1. If the vehicle prefer-
ences E and G follow the type I extreme value distribution, the optimal consumer
decision is a threshold policy on the difference of the vehicle preferences E − G:
E − G ≥ τe purchase electric vehicles
E − G < τe purchase gasoline vehicles
where
τe = β1E(UG) − β2pG − β1 ln[
NE∑
i=0
exp(α1 fi − α2ρi)] + β2pE. (5.6)
The EV market share is given by
ηe =
qβ1
qβ1 +C
, (5.7)
where C = exp[β1E(UG) − β2pG + β2pE] and q = ∑NEi=0 exp(α1 fi − α2ρi).
2. If the vehicle preference of EV is uniformly distributed with E ∼ U(0, 1) and
G = 1− E, the optimal consumer decision is a threshold policy on the realization
of the consumer preference E,
E ≥ τu purchase electric vehicles
E < τu purchase gasoline vehicles
where
τu =
[
[β1E(UG) − β2pG − β1 ln(q) + β2pE + 1]/2
]1
0
. (5.8)
The EV market share is given by
ηu = 1 − τu. (5.9)
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3. Under both assumptions, the charging service market share captured by charging
station i is given by
Pi =
exp(α1 fi − α2ρi)∑NE
k=0 exp(α1 fk − α2ρk)
,
qi
q
. (5.10)
Proof. To derive the optimal consumer vehicle decision from (5.2-5.3), we first
compute the expected maximum charging utility from (5.5) using the type I
extreme value distribution of i. Specifically,
E(UE) = ln[
∑NE
k=0 exp(α1 fk − α2ρk)]
, ln(
∑NE
k=0 qk) = ln(q),
(5.11)
where qk = exp(α1 fk − α2ρk).
Next, by substituting E(UE) into (5.2), the consumer’s optimal vehicle choice
is given by a threshold policy on E − G. In particular, the consumer purchases
an EV if
E − G ≥ β1E(UG) − β2pG − β1 ln(q) + β2pE. (5.12)
Under the assumption of uniform distribution, by substituting G = 1 − E into
(5.12), we have (5.8).
From [100, chap. 4], the EV market share and the EVCS market share are
given by (5.7), (5.9) and (5.10). 
From the expression of the market share, we can explore the effects of op-
erational cost and capital cost of EVs and gasoline vehicles. When the price
elasticity β2 is positive, the EV market share is inversely proportional to the
exponential price difference between EVs and gasoline vehicles in the extreme
preference case. In the uniform preference case, the market share is linear in the
price difference with a negative slope (−β2/2). The effect of charging is reflected
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in the sum of exponential utilities q. Lower charging cost will increase q thus
benefit the EV market share. Meanwhile, limited number of charging station
will bring down the exponential utilities and hinder the successful launch of
EVs. The threshold on the consumer vehicle preference is a linear combination
of the difference in the capital cost and the operational utility (charging utility)
between the EVs and gasoline vehicles.
With Theorem 6, we examine the trend of EV market share as a function of
the charging station density, the charging price, and the price of EV. In particu-
lar, under both preference assumptions, the expressions of EV market share is
an increasing and concave function of the number of available charging station-
s. This means that the marginal return of building additional charging stations
reduces with the number of available charging stations.
Figure 5.4(a) and 5.4(b) show numerical evaluations of the market share as
the density of charging stations. In addition to the concavity of the market share
function, we also observe that the market share accelerates faster with a lower
EV purchasing price.
For the uniform preference model, Figure 5.4(a) shows a dead zone effect,
as a result of the ceiling operation in (5.8). In particular, the EV market share is
zero unless the density of charging stations exceeds a certain level. In addition,
we see that lowering EV purchasing cost helps the market share escaping the
dead zone. Figure 5.5(a) shows that the critical density of charging stations at
which the market share becomes positive grows as a “convex” function of the
EV purchasing price. The convexity of this function means that the requirement
of initial investment on EVCSs stiffens as the cost of EV purchase increases.
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Under the extreme value distribution assumption, there is no dead zone ef-
fect. The EV market share ηe is always positive. However, if we treat ηe ≤ 5%
as a launch failure of EV, there is a critical density below which EV is consid-
ered failed. In Figure 5.5(b), the critical density of EVCSs is shown to have a
“convex” shape in terms of EV prices.
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Figure 5.4: EV market share vs. density of charging stations. pG = $17450,
E(UG) = 4.5052, ρi = 0.2$/kWh.
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Figure 5.5: Critical density of charging stations vs. EV price pE.
pG = $17450, E(UG) = 4.5052, ρi = 0.2$/kWh.
The “convex” shape of the critical density of EVCSs in terms of EV prices
implies at least two points regarding the successful launch of EVs. From the
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manufacturers’ point of view, the higher the MSRP is, the harder the EV would
survive not only due to the prohibitive price but also the gap between the ex-
isting number and desired number of EVCSs. Thus lower price would not only
attract consumers to purchase EVs but also alleviate the strain of building more
charging stations. From the government point of view, it is important to deter-
mine the subsidy policy considering that what range the price of EVs lies in.
When the price of EV is extremely high, giving more subsidy to EV purchasing
would significantly reduce the required number of EVCSs. But as the subsidy
increases, the effect on reducing the required number of EVCSs is getting small-
er. At some point, it will be less effective to subsidize the EV purchasing than to
build more charging stations. This phenomenon is also confirmed in the empir-
ical simulation in [91] that building charging stations may be a more effective
way to boost EV sales in the EV launch stage.
5.4 Investor Decisions
After the discussion about the consumer model and her decision, we now fo-
cus on the investor decision model that includes the selection of the charging
stations locations and the optimal pricing of charging.
5.4.1 Investor Decision Model and Assumptions
We make the following assumptions about the investor model:
B1. We consider a single investor who also operates all charging stations. This
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implies the monopolistic competition in the charging service market.
B2. We assume that the deferred investment earns interest at a rate of γ.
B3. The investor knows the utility functions of the consumers.
To solve the optimization in (5.1), we proceed with backward induction. In
Section 5.4.2, we find the optimal pricing with fixed EVCS locations. In Sec-
tion 5.4.3 we optimally choose the charging station locations.
5.4.2 Optimal Charging Price
Given the set of charging station locations C, the investor determines the opti-
mal charging price ~ρ to maximize the life time discounted total operation profit.
Specifically, the investor has the following optimization.
max
~ρ
Π = max
~ρ
NcDη(~ρ)
NE∑
i=1
Pi(~ρ)(ρi − c¯i), (5.13)
where Nc is the total amount of consumers (householders), D the discounted life
time driving mileage of a typical EV, η(~ρ) the expected EV market share given in
Theorem 6 (here we make the dependency on charging price explicit), Pi(~ρ) the
market share of station i, i.e., the fraction of EV owners who charge at station i,
and c¯i the marginal operation cost of station i. The optimal charging price ρ∗i is
given by the following theorem.
Theorem 7 (Charging price). For fixed set of charging stations C = {( fi, c¯i), i =
1, · · · ,NE}, the optimal charging price ρ∗i , i = 1, · · · ,NE generates uniform profits across
charging stations. In particular,
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1. Under the type I extreme value vehicle preference distribution assumption,
ρ∗i,e − c¯i =
1
α2β1(1 − ηe(~ρ∗e))(1 − P0(~ρ∗e)) + α2P0(~ρ∗e)
, (5.14)
where ηe is the market share of EV, ~ρ∗e = (ρ∗1,e, . . . , ρ
∗
NE ,e) the vec-
tor of optimal charging price, ρ0,e the cost of charging at home, and
P0(~ρ∗e) =
exp(α1 f0−α2ρ0,e)
exp(α1 f0−α2ρ0,e)+∑NEk=1 exp(α1 fk−α2ρ∗k,e) the probability that the consumer charges
at home.
2. Under the uniform vehicle preference distribution assumption,
ρ∗i,u − c¯i =
1
α2β1(1−P0(~ρ∗u))
2ηu(~ρ∗u)
+ α2P0(~ρ∗u)
, (5.15)
where ηu, ~ρ∗u, ρ0,u, and P0(~ρ∗u) are similarly defined.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of the first order optimality condition. 
Note that the right hand sides of equation (5.14) and (5.15) are the same for
any charging station i ∈ {1, . . . ,NE}. This means that the profits generated from
different charging stations are the same. Equation (5.14) and (5.15) do not have
closed-form solutions but the optimal prices can be solved numerically. Since
0 < P0(~ρ∗j) < 1 and 0 < η j ≤ 1 for either j ∈ {e, u}, the revenue is strictly positive.
The indirect network effect from the EV market can be found in both charg-
ing profit and the total profit. In both uniform and extreme preference cases,
if there is a shock in the EV market share, the uniform profit across charging
stations will increase and the total profit will also grow, which will encourage
the investment in more charging stations.
The profit across different charging stations is the same. However, since the
operating cost across charging stations is different, the charging price of stations
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varies. Intuitively, more attractive charging stations have higher operating cost
(labor cost, electricity price, and so on), thus higher charging price. Consumers
balance the convenience of the station and the charging cost and make charging
decisions. The price of gasoline and gasoline vehicles affects the charging profit
indirectly through the EV market share η. The lower the gasoline price and
gasoline vehicle price are, the smaller the EV market share is and this brings
down the charging profit of charging stations.
As NE → ∞, the public charging of EV becomes more and more convenient,
which not only motivates consumers to purchase EVs but also encourages them
to charge outside home. As a result, the EV market share η j → 1 and the fraction
of charging at home P0(~ρ∗j) → 0. Based on this trend, we have the convergence
of the marginal charging profit shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 8 (Charging price convergence). Consider a fixed set of charging stations
C = {( fi, c¯i), i = 1, · · · ,NE}. Let v = ∑NEi=1 exp(α1 fi − α2c¯i) be the sum of exponentials of
systematic charging utilities.
1. For the extreme distributed vehicle preference, the per-charging station profit
re = ρ∗i,e − c¯i grows logarithmically with the sum utilities, i.e.,
re = ln v/α2 + o(ln v). (5.16)
2. For uniformly distributed vehicle preference, the charging profit ru = ρ∗i,u − c¯i is
strictly increasing with the number of charging facilities and converges to a con-
stant. Specifically,
ru = 2/α2β1 + o(1) (v→ +∞). (5.17)
Proof. The detailed proof can be found in Appendix B.1. 
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In Theorem 8, the increasing per-charging station profit is because of the as-
sumption of monopolistic investor. More charging stations motivate more con-
sumers to purchase EVs and bring larger charging demand. The investor will
take the advantage and set a higher markup. In both cases, the profit increase
corresponding to the increase of number of charging stations NE (or equivalent-
ly, ν,) is decreasing, which is due to the diminishing of the network effect.
The profit is also affected by the consumer sensitivity to the charging price.
When consumers are more sensitive to the price (α2 is large), the optimal charg-
ing price is close to the marginal cost across charging stations.
The different convergence comes from different preference assumptions.
Under the extremely distributed preference assumption, the EV market share
strictly increases as the density of EVCSs increases. Thus the profit grows log-
arithmically because of the expanding charging demand. While under the uni-
form distributed preference assumption, the EV market share reaches the upper
limit when there are enough EVCSs. So the profit converges to a constant.
5.4.3 Optimal Charging Station Locations
After the discussion about the optimal charging price, we consider the
choice of charging station locations. Given the set of location candidates
C = {s¯i = ( fi, c¯i), i = 1, · · · ,NL}, the investor has the following optimization.
maxC⊆C Π(C, ~ρ∗j(C)) −
∑|C|
i=1 F (s¯i)
subject to
∑|C|
i=1 F (s¯i) ≤ B
(5.18)
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where F (s¯i) is the building cost of charging station s¯i and Π(C, ~ρ∗j(C)) the opera-
tional profit.
In general, the optimal investment decision from (5.18) requires combina-
torial search for C, which is computationally inefficient and sometimes not
tractable. However, the convergence of the optimal charging prices across
charging stations in Theorem 8 makes it possible to separate the price decision
and the location choice, which leads to a linear complexity heuristic algorithm.
Algorithm 3: Greedy Investment Algorithm
1. Compute the exponential systematic utility vi = exp(α1 fi − α2c¯i) and sorted
list {v(i)}.
2. Set N = 1.
while N ≤ NL and ∑Ni=1 F (s¯i) ≤ B do
Compute P˜N , Π(s1, · · · , sN) −∑Ni=1 F (s¯i).
if P˜N < P˜N−1 or
∑N
i=1 F (s¯i) > B then
STOP;
else
N ← (N + 1).
end if
end while
The Greedy Investment Algorithm (GIA) given in Algorithm 3 first ranks
the charging stations by the exponential systematic part of the charging utility,
vi = exp(α1 fi − α2c¯i). It then adds charging stations to the investment list one at a
time in the decreasing order of exponential systematic utility vi until either the
budget is exhausted or the cumulated profit starts to decrease.
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By ignoring the dependency of charging locations in the marginal charging
profit (ρ∗i, j − c¯i) in (5.18), the GIA is not optimal in general. As NE increases,
however, the marginal charging profit increases and converges, which makes
the algorithm asymptotically optimal.
Theorem 9 (Asymptotic optimality). Assume the building costs of charging stations
are constant, i.e., F (s¯i) = (1 + γ)F0, where γ is the interest rate. There exists an M > 0
such that when N > M, the greedy algorithm is optimal under both the type I extreme
value distribution and the uniform distribution assumption.
Proof. The detailed proof can be found in Appendix B.2. 
After obtaining the optimal set of charging stations C∗ and the optimal charg-
ing price vector ~ρ∗j, the investor makes the investment if the investment profit
[Π(C∗, ~ρ∗j) −
∑|C∗ |
i=1 F (s¯i)] is positive. Otherwise, the investor will defer his invest-
ment and earn interest at rate γ.
To make [Π(C∗, ~ρ∗j) −
∑|C∗ |
i=1 F (s¯i)] positive, the EV price and the building costs
of charging stations need to be low enough, which implies that the subsidies for
EV purchase and charging stations are necessary to the successful launch of EV.
Meanwhile the price of gasoline and electricity affect the charging profit Π. The
high petroleum price and cheap electricity benefit the EV market.
5.4.4 Social welfare optimization
We now consider the investment problem from the viewpoint of a social plan-
ner who makes investment decisions based on social welfare maximization and
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compare the difference between the solution of the private market defined in
Section 5.4.3 and that of a social planner.
Recall the investor utility S I(C, ~ρ j) and the consumer utility SC(C, ~ρ j) given
in (5.1) and (5.3):
S I(C, ~ρ j) = Π(C, ~ρ j) −∑|C|i=1 F (s¯i),
SC(C, ~ρ j) = E[max{VE(C, ~ρ j, E),VG(G)}].
Under the type I extreme value vehicle preference distribution assumption, the
consumer utility is stated as
SC(C, ~ρe) = ln
[(∑|C|
i=0 exp(α1 fi − α2ρi,e)
)β1
C1 +C2
]
,
C1 = exp(−β2pE + Φ), C2 = exp[β1E(UG) − β2pG + Φ].
Under the uniform vehicle preference distribution assumption, the con-
sumer utility is stated as:
SC(C, ~ρu) =
[(
ηu(C, ~ρu)
)2
+ β1E(UG) − β2pG + Φ − 12
]
.
Assume that the social planner does not operate the charging station thus
can not determine the charging price or the vehicle price. He only determines
the set of charging stations locations to build by regulation. For example, Beijing
government recently requires 18% of parking lots in new residential communi-
ties have to install charging stations [94].
The social planner’s decision is stated as:
maxC⊆C λNcSC(C, ~ρ∗j(C)) + S I(C, ~ρ∗j(C))
subject to
∑|C|
i=1 F (s¯i) ≤ B
, (5.19)
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where Nc is the total amount of consumers (householders), ~ρ∗j(C) the vector of
the optimal charging prices determined by the charging station operators given
the charging station locations, and λ > 0 the weight of the consumers surplus.
The greedy investment algorithm in Algorithm 3 can also be applied to solve
for the social welfare optimized investment in charging stations. The following
theorem characterizes the difference between the social welfare optimal solution
and the market solution.
Theorem 10 (Social welfare). Let C∗ be the optimal set of charging stations deter-
mined by the investor, and assume |C∗|  1. Let C∗∗ be the optimal charging locations
determined by the social planner. Under both the type I extreme value distribution and
the uniform distribution assumptions, |C∗∗| > |C∗|.
Proof. See B.3. 
Theorem 10 implies that the monopolistic market solution tends to under-
build charging stations. The under-provision of EVCSs and lower adoption of
EVs relative to the socially optimal outcomes are due to two types of market fail-
ures: market power and indirect network effects (or externalities). The assump-
tion of monopolistic investor leads to under-provision of EVCSs and a higher
charging price than a competitive solution. This will in turn lead to a lower EV
adoption. Therefore, introducing competition in EVCS provision will help EV d-
iffusion. While this form of market failure is a result of our model setup and can
be relaxed, the second form of market failure is inherent in the EV market as em-
pirically confirmed in [91]. Indirect network effects are externalities which are
not accounted for in individual investment and purchase decisions. They will
lead to a wedge in socially optimal outcomes and market outcomes, which justi-
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fies government interventions. For example, government can provide subsidies
to charging station investors as the U.S. DOE does through various funding pro-
grams or mandate the provision of charging stations in real estate development
as recently implemented in China [94].
5.5 Discussions
5.5.1 Effects of subsidy
We consider here the effects of subsidy, either to EV consumers or to the investor
of EV charging stations. The results obtained in Section 5.3 and Section 5.4 pro-
vide the basis for numerical results presented here.
Fixing the total policy budget as 230 million dollars, we vary the weight of
subsidy for EV purchase among the total policy budget. A bisection algorithm
is applied to search for the subsidy amounts for each EV and EVCS so that the
constraints of total budget and budget weight are satisfied.
Figure 5.6(a) shows the EV market share against subsidy weight with differ-
ent values of β2. In the utility model (5.2), β2 represents the consumer sensitivity
to the EV price. When β2 was large, consumers cared more about the EV price
than the characteristics of charging facilities. Increasing EV subsidy dramatical-
ly boostd up the EV market share. On the other hand, when β2 was close to 0,
consumers mainly concerned about the charging services and the subsidy for
EV purchase played a tiny role in the EV market share evolution.
Similar impact exists in the EVCS market. As shown in Figure 5.6(b), when
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β2 was large, the consumer was more sensitive to EV price. In this case, the pol-
icy of subsidizing the EV purchase was more effective, not only in stimulating
the EV purchasing but also driving the investor to deploy more charging facili-
ties because of the EV popularity. When β2 was close to 0, consumers were less
price sensitive. In this case, putting more weight to EV subsidy was less helpful.
While subsidizing the charging station encouraged the investment in charging
services which also benefited the EV consumer by making the charging more
convenient.
This result may suggest that, at the launch period, more tax credit to EV
purchasing may be not efficient in stimulating the market share of EVs. One
possible reason is that the early adopters of EVs have a higher wage income
comparing to average vehicle consumers. Thus they are less price sensitive and
concern more about other characteristics of the vehicle, such as the environmen-
tal impact or the driving experience.
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Figure 5.6: Subsidy effect with different coefficients
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5.5.2 Socially optimal solution vs. private market solution
In Section 5.4.4, the analytical result shows the socially optimal solution requires
to invest in more charging facilities than that from the private market solution.
In this section, a numerical result is presented to illustrate this difference in the
EVCS market. In the simulation, we assume that all charging stations have the
same favorability rate f and building cost F. In the private market setting, the
investor simply chooses how many charging stations to invest and determines
the optimal charging price to maximize the total profit collected from charging
stations defined in (5.18). In the socially optimal solution, the social planner
maximizes the social welfare defined in (5.19) by determining the number of
charging stations.
When the weight of the consumer was small (λ = 10), the decision of the
social planner was close to the outcome of the private market. As shown in Fig-
ure 5.7(a), the market share of the socially optimal solution was slightly greater
than the private market solution. We observed that when pE = $34570, the in-
vestor would not invest in any charging stations due to the neglectful market
share of EVs. The uniform unit charging profit of the private market solution
was also decreasing as the price of EV increased. This could be explained by
(5.14) where the profit was decreasing when the market share η shrinked. The
result of the socially optimal solution was close to the private market outcome
except when the price of EV was high (pE = $34500). In this case, the investor
had no motivation to invest in any charging stations due to the neglectful mar-
ket share of EVs. However, the social planner would still build some charging
stations taking into account of the utilities of EV consumers. As shown in Fig-
ure 5.7(d), when the EV price was low, the total operation profit from charging
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(a) EV market share vs. EV price. (b) Density of EVCS vs. EV price.
(c) Charging price vs. EV price. (d) Total profit of building charging sta-
tions vs. EV price.
Figure 5.7: Socially optimal solution vs. private market solution. pG =
$17460, Nc = 106 , F = $15000, f = 0.001, c = 0.08$/mile, α1 =
10, α2 = 25, β1 = 2, β2 = 7 × 10−4, λ = 10.
stations dominated the consumer surplus. As the price of EV raised, the profit
dropped sharply due to the shrink of the EV market share. However, as the price
of EV increased, the charging cost droped, as shown in Figure 5.7(c), and raised
the charging utility and the consumer surplus. When the profit dropped below
the consumer surplus, the social planner mainly focused on the consumers and
built charging stations even when the total charging profit was negative.
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(a) EV market share vs. EV price. (b) Density of EVCS vs. EV price.
(c) Charging price vs. EV price. (d) Total profit of building charging sta-
tions vs. EV price.
Figure 5.8: Socially optimal solution vs. private market solution. pG =
$17460, Nc = 106 , F = $15000, f = 0.001, c = 0.08$/mile, α1 =
10, α2 = 25, β1 = 2, β2 = 7 × 10−4, λ = 100.
As shown in Figure 5.8, when the weight of consumer surplus was larger
(λ = 100), the socially optimal solution deviated from the private market out-
come significantly, especially when the EV price was high. The market share of
EV, the density of charging services and the unit charging profit of the socially
optimal solution were larger than the ones of the private market outcome. This
could be explained by Figure 5.8(d). When pE was low, the consumer surplus
was comparable to the profit of charging stations and social planner biased to
123
consumers notably. When pE was high, the profit went to negative and was
dominated by the consumer surplus. The social planner’s decision deviated
from the private market outcome significantly.
The simulation result suggests that, bringing down the cost of EVs makes all
parties benefited. The investors of charging station build more charging services
and earn more profit with lower EV prices. The consumers face attractive EV
price and have more charging options which eliminates the anxiety of driving
range. Moreover, the private market outcomes is closer to the socially optimal
solution as the price of EV decreases.
When the EV price is not low enough and the private market solution devi-
ates the socially optimal solution, it is reasonable to supply subsidy to the EV
purchase. Meanwhile, subsidies to charging stations or other policies can al-
so fill the gap between the private market outcomes and the socially efficient
solution.
5.5.3 Other policies
Beyond the subsidy policy, the proposed model can be directly used to study
other policies, such as regulations. The government may require a minimal
share of EVs in the vehicle fleet [144] such as the Zero Emission Vehicle program
in California. This could stimulate the EV market and attract more investment
on the EV charging station via the feedback loop between the EV and EVCS
market. The impact of this kind of policy can be estimated by adding an external
shock to the EV market and simulating the result in the EVCS market. Similarly,
the government may mandate the minimal number of EV charging stations in
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public parking lots as being recently adopted the Beijing municipal government.
Another approach is to allow the EV charging operator to participant in the
operation of the power system, not just a price taker. By doing so, the operator
of the charging stations may adjust the EV charging profile according to the
requirement from the power system operator to make the grid more reliable
and efficient. These vehicle to grid (V2G) services typically include spinning
reserves, frequency regulation and peak power supply [80, 95, 57, 136].
The option to participate in the power market may attract more investment
in charging stations. The charging cost would be lower not only due to the com-
petition between charging stations, but also the income from the V2G services.
In this case, the social planner has more motivation to help the successful launch
of EVs and support more charging stations, since the adoption of EVs not only
generates environmental benefits but also help the grid to be cleaner, more ro-
bust and more efficient. The EV owners will enjoy cheaper charging prices and
other consumers have cleaner energy. Everybody wins.
To model the impact of the adoption of the V2G services, the decision model
of the investor needs to be extended. When making the investment decision, the
investor needs to consider not only the charging profit but also the V2G revenue.
One possible way is to add one more term in the profit function Π to indicate
the V2G income as a function of the EV charging population. When operating
the charging stations, the charging price is designed to maximize the total profit
from EV charging and V2G services. The density of EV charging stations are
expected to increase from the result of the case without V2G options. The profit
of investors and consumer surplus are expected to increase as well.
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5.5.4 Applications
In this chapter, we considered the two-sided EV market in a homogenous set-
ting. The charging rate of the stations is assumed uniform and the market across
areas are indifferent. In this subsection, we will discuss several directions for fu-
ture research, including the EV market under heterogeneous settings, and how
our models can be helpful to understand the market outcome.
One possible direction is to incorporate the choices of different types of
charging station technology in the decision model. The charging time of dif-
ferent charging rate varies dramatically, which affects the consumer choice of
charging stations, and the capital cost differs greatly, which has an influence
on the investment decisions. The deployment of all three levels of charging
was considered in Luo et al. ([96]) where a sequential deployment of charg-
ing stations with various charging rate was simulated. To consider the option
of choosing charging rate in our model, we can add one more variable to in-
dicate the charging level of the charging station in the investor decision model
of EV charging stations. In the consumer choice model, the waiting time can
be included in the utility function as part of the charging cost. In this case, the
attractions and capital cost of EV charging stations with various charging levels
are different and the investor’s decision is more complicated.
Besides the different charging technologies, we can evaluate different poli-
cy impacts in heterogeneous markets. In different locations, the environmental
benefit of EVs are different and the policies may also vary. In areas where a
large share of electricity is generated from renewables or hydro, the environ-
mental benefits would be higher while in areas with a large share of coal-fired
power generation, the environmental impact of EVs could even be negative. To
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incorporate this heterogeneity, we could include the environmental benefits of
EV adoption in the objective function of social planner’s decision in equation
(19) and solve the social planner’s problems in different locations individual-
ly. Recognizing this heterogeneity, the government policies could vary across
locations in order to achieve the spatially-variant optimal level of EV adoption.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDICES FOR CHAPTER 3
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
In this appendix, we provide an elementary proof of indexability. That is, for
any state s˜ of an arm, there is a critical ν(s˜) such that if and only if ν ≥ ν(s˜) the
first term in the Bellman equation (3.10) is larger than or equal to the the second
term in a single arm ν-subsidy problem.
A.1.1 Indexability of dummy arms
The indexability of dummy arms is straightforward. For i ∈ {N + 1, · · · ,N + M},
there is no EV arrival, and only the charging cost evolve. The Bellman equation
of the ν-subsidy problem is given by
Vνi (0, 0, ck) = max{β
∑
k′ Pk,k′Vνi (0, 0, ck′) + ν, β
∑
k′ Pk,k′Vνi (0, 0, ck′)}.
If and only if ν ≥ 0, the first term is larger than the second term and it is
optimal to deactivate the dummy arm. Otherwise, the active action is optimal.
So a dummy arm is indexable and its Whittle’s index is νi(0, 0, ck) = 0.
A.1.2 Indexability of regular arms
We now prove the indexability of regular arms by induction. We first show the
Whittle’s index νi(t, j, ck) exists for T ≤ 1 and all j and ck, and the difference of
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the value function gν(T, j, ck) = Vνi (T, j + 1, ck) − Vνi (T, j, ck) satisfies some special
property for T = 1. Then assuming the Whittle’s index νi(T, j, ck) exists and the
property of gν(T, j, ck) holds for T = t − 1, we show νi(T, j, ck) exists and the prop-
erty of gν(T, j, ck) holds for T = t.
Proof. When T = 0
there is no EV waiting at the charger. The Bellman equation is stated as
Vνi (0, 0, ck) = max{ν + βWνk , βWνk }.
where
Wνk = Q(0, 0)
∑
k′
Pk,k′Vνi (0, 0, ck′) +
∑
T ′
∑
j
∑
k′
Q(T ′, j)Pk,k′Vνi (T
′, j, ck′)
is the expected reward of possible arrivals. If and only if ν ≥ 0, the first term is
larger and the passive action is optimal. Thus νi(0, 0, ck) = 0.
When T = 1
there are two possible cases.
• If B = 0, the Bellman equation is stated as
Vνi (1, 0, ck) = max{ν + βWνk , βWνk }.
Thus νi(1, 0, ck) = 0.
• If j ≥ 1, the Bellman equation is stated as
Vνi (1, j, ck) = max{ν − F( j) + βWνk , 1 − ck − F( j − 1) + βWνk }.
If and only if ν ≥ 1 − ck + F( j) − F( j − 1), the passive action is optimal.
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Thus the Whittle’s index for T = 1 exists and the closed-form is stated as
follows.
νi(1, j, ck) =

0 if j = 0
1 − ck + F( j) − F( j − 1) if j ≥ 1
(A.1)
Denote the difference of the value function as
gν(T, j, ck) = Vνi (T, j + 1, ck) − Vνi (T, j, ck)
We note that the difference of the value function is continuous and piecewise
linear in ν. Specially, denote G as a set of functions of ν such that g(ν) ∈ G if
and only if g(ν) is a continuous piecewise linear function in ν, there exist ν and
ν¯ such that, ∂g(ν)/∂ν ≥ −1 when ν ∈ [ν, ν¯], and ∂g(ν)/∂ν = 0 when ν < [ν, ν¯]. We
show that, when T = 1, gν(T, j, ck) ∈ G.
• If j = 0,
gν(1, j, ck) = Vνi (1, 1, ck) − Vνi (1, 0, ck).
– If νi(1, 1, ck) > νi(1, 0, ck) = 0,
gν(1, j, ck) =

1 − ck, if ν < 0;
1 − ck − ν, if 0 ≤ ν < νi(1, 1, ck);
−F(1), if νi(1, 1, ck) ≤ ν.
– If νi(1, 1, ck) ≤ νi(1, 0, ck) = 0,
gν(1, j, ck) =

1 − ck, if ν < νi(1, 1, ck);
ν − F(1), if νi(1, 1, ck) ≤ ν < 0;
−F(1), if νi(1, 1, ck) ≤ ν.
• If j ≥ 1,
gν(1, j, ck) = Vνi (1, j, ck) − Vνi (1, j, ck).
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Since νi(1, j + 1, ck) ≥ νi(1, j, ck) by (A.1),
gν(1, j, ck) =

F( j − 1) − F( j), if ν < νi(1, j, ck);
1 − ck − ν, if νi(1, j, ck) ≤ ν < νi(1, j + 1, ck);
F( j) − F( j + 1), if νi(1, j + 1, ck) ≤ ν.
So g(1, j, ck) is continuous piecewise linear in ν and exist ν and ν¯ such that
∂g(1, j, ck)/∂ν ≥ −1 when ν ∈ [ν, ν¯] and ∂g(1, j, ck)/∂ν = 0 otherwise.
When T ≥ 2
assuming the Whittle’s index νi(T, j, ck) exits and gν(T, j, ck) ∈ G for T = t − 1, we
show νi(T, j, ck) exits and gν(T, j, ck) ∈ G for the case T = t.
First, existence of νi(T, j, ck) when T = t.
• If B = 0, the Bellman equation is stated as follows.
Vνi (t, 0, ck) = max{β
∑
k′
Pk,k′Vνi (t − 1, 0, ck′) + ν, β
∑
k′
Pk,k′Vνi (t − 1, 0, ck′)}.
If and only if ν ≥ 0, the first term is larger than the second term and the
passive action is optimal. Thus νi(t, 0, ck) = 0.
• If j ≥ 1, the Bellman equation is stated as follows.
Vνi (t, j, ck) = max{β
∑
k′
Pk,k′Vνi (t−1, j, ck′)+ν, β
∑
k′
Pk,k′Vνi (t−1, j−1, ck′)+1−ck}.
(A.2)
Denote the difference between the two actions as
f ν(t, j, ck) , ν − (1 − ck) + β
∑
k′
Pk,k′gν(t − 1, j − 1, ck′),
where
gν(t − 1, j − 1, ck′) = Vνi (t − 1, j, ck′) − Vνi (t − 1, j − 1, ck′).
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Since gν(t − 1, j − 1, ck′) ∈ G by assumption, f ν(t, j, ck) is continuous and
piece-wise linear in ν. Denote
ν(t, j, ck) , mink′ ν(t − 1, j − 1, ck′),
ν¯(t, j, ck) , maxk′ ν¯(t − 1, j − 1, ck′).
where ∂gν(t − 1, j − 1, ck′)/∂ν ≥ −1 if and only if ν ∈ [ν(t − 1, j − 1, ck′), ν¯(t − 1, j − 1, ck′)].
We have
∂ f ν(t, j, ck)/∂ν =

≥ 0, if ν ∈ [ν(t, j, ck), ν¯(t, j, ck)];
1, otherwise.
So f ν(t, j, ck) is continuous and non-decreasing in ν. When ν = −∞,
f ν(t, j, ck) = −∞. When ν = +∞, f ν(t, j, ck) = +∞. Thus there is a cross point
of f ν(t, j, ck) and the ν-axis. Define νi(t, j, ck) , minν{ f ν(t, j, ck) = 0}. If and
only if ν ≥ νi(t, j, ck), the first term in (A.2) is larger or equal to the second
term and the passive action is optimal. By definition, νi(t, j, ck) is the Whit-
tle’s index.
The existence of νi(t, j, ck) is shown. Next we show gν(t, j, ck) ∈ G.
• If j = 0,
gν(T, j, ck) = Vνi (t, 1, ck) − Vνi (t, 0, ck).
– If νi(t, 1, ck) > νi(t, 0, ck) = 0,
gν(t, 0, ck) =

1 − ck, if ν < 0;
1 − ck − ν, if 0 ≤ ν < νi(t, 1, ck);
β
∑
k′ Pk,k′gν(t − 1, 0, ck′), if νi(t, 1, ck) ≤ ν.
– If νi(t, 1, ck) ≤ νi(t, 0, ck) = 0,
gν(t, 0, ck) =

1 − ck, if ν < νi(t, 1, ck);
ν + β
∑
k′ Pk,k′gν(t − 1, 0, ck′), if νi(t, 1, ck, ) ≤ ν < 0;
β
∑
k′ Pk,k′gν(t − 1, 0, ck′), if 0 ≤ ν.
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• If j ≥ 1,
gν(t, j, ck) = Vνi (t, j + 1, ck) − Vνi (t, j, ck).
– If νi(t, j + 1, ck) > νi(t, j, ck),
gν(t, j, ck) =

β
∑
k′ Pk,k′gν(t − 1, j − 1, ck′), if ν < νi(t, j, ck);
1 − ck − ν, if νi(t, j, ck) ≤ ν < νi(t, j + 1, ck);
β
∑
k′ Pk,k′gν(t − 1, j, ck′), if νi(t, j + 1, ck) ≤ ν.
– If νi(t, j + 1, ck) ≤ νi(t, j, ck),
gν(t, j, ck) =

β
∑
k′ Pk,k′gν(t − 1, j − 1, ck′),
if ν < νi(t, j + 1, ck);
ν − (1 − ck) + β∑k′ Pk,k′[gν(t − 1, j, ck′) + gν(t − 1, j − 1, ck′)],
if νi(t, B + 1, ck) ≤ ν < νi(t, B, ck);
β
∑
k′ Pk,k′gν(t − 1, j, ck′),
if νi(t, j, ck) ≤ ν.
Clearly, gν(T, j, ck) is a linear combination of gν(T − 1, j, ck′) and gν(T − 1, j − 1, ck′).
Since gν(T − 1, j, ck′) ∈ G for all j and ck′ by assumption, we have gν(T, j, ck) ∈ G
as well.
Thus, by induction, the Whittle’s index νi(T, j, ck) exists and gν(T − 1, j, ck) ∈ G
for all T , j, and ck.

A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Since the charging cost c0 is constant, we will omit the cost in the state of
arms for simplicity. In Appendix A.1.1 we have shown that the Whittle’s index
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of the dummy arms is νi(0, 0) = 0.
For regular arms, we showed in (A.1) that νi(1, 0) = 0 and νi(1, j) = 1 − c0 + F( j) − F( j − 1)
when j ≥ 1. Next, we show the closed-form of the Whittle’s index for the case
of T ≥ 2 using induction.
A.2.1 When T = 2
The discussion is divided into two conditions.
• If j = 1,
Vνi (2, 1) = max{ν + βVνi (1, 1), 1 − c0 + βVνi (1, 0)}.
The difference between active and passive actions
f ν(2, 1)
= ν − (1 − c0) + βgν1(1, 0)]
=

ν − (1 − β)(1 − c0), if ν < 0;
(1 − β)[ν − (1 − c0)], if 0 ≤ ν < 1 − c0 + F(1);
ν − (1 − c0) − βF(1), if 1 − c0 + F(1) ≤ ν;
equals to 0 when ν = 1 − c0. Thus νi(2, 1) = 1 − c0.
• If j ≥ 2, the Bellman equation is stated as follows.
Vνi (2, j) = max{ν + βVνi (1, j), 1 − c0 + βVνi (1, j − 1)}.
Denote ∆F( j) = F( j) − F( j − 1). The difference between active and passive
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actions
f ν(2, j)
= ν − (1 − c0) + βgν(1, j − 1)
=

ν − (1 − c0) − β∆F( j − 1), if ν < 1 − c0 + ∆F( j − 1);
(1 − β)[ν − (1 − c0)], if 1 − c0 + ∆F( j − 1) ≤ ν < 1 − c0 + ∆F( j);
ν − (1 − c0) + β∆F( j), if 1 − c0 + ∆F( j) ≤ ν;
equals to 0 when ν = 1 − c0 + β[F( j − 1) − F( j − 2)]. Thus
νi(2, j) = 1 − c0 + β[F( j − 1) − F( j − 2)]
when j ≥ 2.
So (3.11) is true when T = 2.
A.2.2 When T > 2
Assume equation (3.11) holds when T = t − 1, we show that it holds when T = t.
• If j = 1,
Vνi (t, j) = max{ν + βVνi (t − 1, 1), 1 − c0 + βVνi (t − 1, 0)}.
The difference between actions is
f ν(t, 1)
= ν − (1 − c0) + βgν(t − 1, 0)
=

ν − (1 − β)(1 − c0), if ν < 0;
(1 − β)[ν − (1 − c0)], if 0 ≤ ν < 1 − c0;
ν − (1 − c0) + β2gν(t − 2, 0) if 1 − c0 ≤ ν.
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The last case can be rewritten as
ν − (1 − c0) + β2gν(t − 2, 0)
= (1 − β)[ν − (1 − c0)] + β[ν − (1 − c0)]
+β2[Vνi (t − 2, 1) − Vνi (t − 2, 0)],
which equals to 0 when ν = 1 − c0 since by assumption νi(t − 1, 1) = 1 − c0.
Thus νi(t, 1) = 1 − c0.
• If 2 ≤ j ≤ t − 2, the difference between actions is stated as follows.
f ν(t, j)
= ν − (1 − c0) + βgν(t − 1, j − 1)
=

ν − (1 − c0) + β2gν(t − 2, j − 2) if ν < 1 − c0;
ν − (1 − c0) + β2gν(t − 2, j − 1) if 1 − c0 ≤ ν.
The latter case equals to 0 when ν = 1 − c0 since νi(t − 1, j) = 1 − c0 when
2 ≤ j ≤ t − 2 by assumption. Thus νi(t, j) = 1 − c0 when 2 ≤ j ≤ t − 2.
• If j = t − 1,
f ν(t, j)
= ν − (1 − c0) + βgν1(t − 1, j − 1)
=

ν − (1 − c0) + β2gν(t − 2, j − 2), if ν < 1 − c0;
(1 − β)[ν − (1 − c0)], if 1 − c0 ≤ ν < 1 − c0 + βt−2F(1);
ν − (1 − c0) + β2gν(t − 2, j − 1), if 1 − c0 + βt−2F(1) ≤ ν;
equals to 0 when ν = 1 − c0. So νi(t, j) = 1 − c0 when j = t − 1.
• If j ≥ t,
f ν(t, j)
= ν − (1 − c0) + βgν(t − 1, j − 1)
=

ν − (1 − c0) + β2gν(t − 2, j − 2) if ν < νi(t − 1, j − 1);
(1 − β)[ν − (1 − c0)], if νi(t − 1, j − 1) ≤ ν < νi(t − 1, j);
ν − (1 − c0) + β2gν(t − 2, j − 1), if νi(t − 1, j) ≤ ν.
(A.3)
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If ν < νi(t − 1, j − 1), according to (3.11)
ν < νi(t − 1 − T ′, j − 1 − T ′)
≤ νi(t − 1 − T ′, j − T ′)
for all 0 ≤ T ′ ≤ t − 1. Thus the first case of (A.3) can be written as,
ν − (1 − c0) + β2gν(t − 2, j − 2)
= ν − (1 − c0) + β3gν(t − 3, j − 3)
= · · ·
= ν − (1 − c0) + βt−1gν(1, j − t + 1)
= ν − (1 − c0) + βt−1[−F( j − t + 1) + F( j − t)].
So when ν = 1 − c0 + βt−1[F( j − t + 1) − F( j − t)], the first case in equation (A.3)
equals to 0 . Thus when B ≥ t, the closed-form of index is stated as:
νi(t, j) = 1 − c0 + βt−1[F( j − t + 1) − F( j − t)].
So (3.11) holds when T = t. By induction, we have (3.11) is true for all T . 
A.3 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. In the problem of (3.8), given an initial state s, denote the scheduling
sequence of the Whittle’s index policy given the charging limit M by piRMAB. For
the same trajectory, denote the charging sequence given no charging limit (or
equivalently, M = N) by piN. Recall that when M = N, the Whittle’s index policy
achieves the optimality. Thus the reward of piN serves as an upper bound of the
optimal reward for any case when M ≤ N, i.e.,
GpiN(s) ≥ G(s) ≥ GpiRMAB(s),
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whereGpiN(s) is the reward collected from piN, GpiRMAB(s) the reward collected from
the Whittle’s index policy piRMAB when M ≤ N, and G(s) the maximum reward
defined in (3.4).
In this appendix, we establish an upper bound of the difference of the val-
ue functions of piRMAB and piN, GpiN(s) −GpiRMAB(s), which serves as an upper bound
of the gap-to-optimality of the Whittle’s index policy, G(s) −GpiRMAB(s). We first
quantify GpiN(s) −GpiRMAB(s) by the number of different actions in the charging se-
quences resulted by piRMAB and piN. Then we relate the number of different actions
to the arrivals of EVs in Lemma 3, which gives the expression in (3.12).
Note that, piN has no capacity limit and activates a regular arm if and only if
its Whittle’s index is positive. A policy piRMAB activates a regular arm if and only
if its indic belongs to the largest M positive ones. Due to the capacity limit M,
if facing the same trajectory of charging cost and the same sequence of arrivals,
the policy piN and piRMAB generate different charging sequences for identical EVs.
As shown in Figure A.1, the charging sequences of an EV Ji with arrival time r
and departure time d determined by piN and piRMAB are plotted. Define the action
differences as follows.
• Event A: piN charges Ji but piRMAB does not.
• Event B: piRMAB charges Ji but piN does not.
• If event A happens at time t, the instant reward difference between piN and
piRMAB is bounded.
RpiNi [t] − RpiRMABi [t] ≤ 1 − cmin
where Rpii [t] is the instant reward collected from Ji by policy pi at time t.
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Figure A.1: Action differences between piN and piM
• If event B happens at time t, the instant reward difference between piN and
piRMAB is also bounded.
RpiNi [t] − RpiRMABi [t] ≤ |1 − cmax|
• At the deadline of Ji, the difference of unfinished EV length resulted by
two policies is bounded by the number of event A. Thus the penalty dif-
ference of two policies is also bounded.
FpiNi [d] − FpiRMABi [d] ≤ F( j +
∑d
t=r 1(A[t])) − F( j)
≤ F( j¯)∑dt=r 1(A[t])
where Fpii [d] is the penalty of Ji resulted by pi at deadline d, j the left over
charging demand under piN of EV i, 1(A[t]) = 1 if and only if event A
happens at t, and F( j¯) the maximum penalty generated by an EV.
So the reward difference collected from Ji up to time t < d is the sum of the first
two cases. ∑t
h=r β
h(RpiNi [h] − RpiRMABi [h])
≤ (1 − cmin)∑th=r 1(A[h])βh + |1 − cmax|∑th=r 1(B[h])βh
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The difference up to deadline t = d is the sum of the three cases.∑d
h=r β
h(RpiNi [h] − RpiRMABi [h])
≤ (1 − cmin)∑dh=r 1(A[h])βh+
|1 − cmax|∑dh=r 1(B[h])βh+
F( j¯)
∑t
h=r 1(A[h])βd
For each time t, we enlarge the penalty term and get a general bound as follows.∑t
h=r β
h(RpiNi [h] − RpiRMABi [h])
≤ (1 − cmin)∑th=r 1(A[h])βh+
|1 − cmax|∑th=r 1(B[h])βh+
F( j¯)
∑t
h=r 1(A[h])βh
Note that, the cumulative number of event A happened up to any fixed time
t is always larger than the number of event B. Formally, we state the follow-
ing lemma to illustrate the relationship between event A and B. The proof is
delayed to Appendix A.3.1.
Lemma 2. Denote 1(A[t]) as whether event A happens at t. Denote #A[t] as the cu-
mulative number of event A happened from r to time t. Define 1(B[t]) and #B[t] respec-
tively. For any t ∈ [r, d],
#A[t] =
∑t
h=r 1(A[h]) ≥ #B[t] =
∑t
h=r 1(B[h])∑t
h=r 1(A[h])βh ≥
∑t
h=r 1(B[h])βh
So the reward difference is bounded as follows.∑t
h=r β
h(RpiNi [h] − RpiRMABi [h])
≤ (1 − cmin + F( j¯) + |1 − cmax|)∑th=r 1(A[h])βh
Now we want to quantify the cumulative number of event A. Event A hap-
pens only when there are more than M EVs with positive Whittle’s index in the
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system under piRMAB. This event can only happen when there are at least M EVs
in the queue. To bound the number of event A, we have the following lemma.
The proof is delayed to Appendix A.3.2.
Lemma 3. Denote I[t] the number of EVs arrived to the system between [t − T¯ + 1, t].
Then for any t,
1(A[t]) ≤ 1(I[t] > M).
Thus for each EV, we have
t∑
h=r
βh(RpiNi [h] − RpiRMABi [h]) ≤ C
t∑
h=r
βh1(I[h] > M), (A.4)
for any t, where C = (1 − cmin + F( j¯) + |1 − cmax|).
If we sum arrivals and take expectation, we have the difference of expected
value function bounded as follows.
GpiN(s) −GpiRMAB(s) ≤ C
∑
t β
tE[1(I[t] > M)I[t]]
= CE[1(I[t] > M)I[t]]/(1 − β).
Since GpiN(s) is an upper bound of G(s), we have
G(s) −GpiRMAB(s) ≤
C
1 − βE[I[t]|I[t] > M]Pr(I[t] > M),
which is Lemma 1. 
A.3.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Denote the remaining charging demand of Ji at time t under policy piN
and piRMAB by jN[t] and jRMAB[t]. Event B happens only when jRMAB[t] > jN[t]. When
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jRMAB[t] = jN[t], if piRMAB charges Ji, which means the Whittle’s index of Ji is pos-
itive, piN also charges Ji. Since at the arrival r, jRMAB[r] = jN[r], event B can only
happen when jRMAB[t] > jN[t], which means event A must have happened before.
This also implies that jRMAB[t] ≥ jN[t] for all t. 
A.3.2 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Recall that, the remaining charging demand under piRMAB is always larger
than the one under piN, i.e., jRMAB[t] ≥ jN[t]. Whenever piN charges some EV Ji, the
Whittle’s index of this EV under piN must be positive. If the Whittle’s index is
monotonically increasing in j, the indic under policy piRMAB must also be positive,
and piRMAB will also charge this EV if the capacity limit allows. Thus event A
happens must imply that there are more than M EVs with positive Whittle’s
index, which requires the arrivals larger than M, i.e., I[t] > M.
In this subsection, we show that the Whittle’s index is increasing in j when
the index is positive and the value function is concave when ν > 0 by induction.
That is, νi(T, j + 1, ck) ≥ νi(T, j, ck), if νi(T, j, ck) > 0 and Vν(T, j, ck) is concave when
ν > 0.
When T = 1
the Whittle’s index is
νi(1, j, ck) =

0, if j = 0;
1 − ck + F( j) − F( j − 1), if j ≥ 1.
If νi(1, j, ck) > 0, νi(1, j + 1, ck) > νi(1, j, ck) due to the convexity of F( j).
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The value function is concave in j when ν > 0.
Vνi (1, j + 2, ck) − 2Vνi (1, j + 1, ck) + Vνi (1, j, ck)
=

−F( j + 2) + 2F( j + 1) − F( j), if νi(1, j, ck) < ν, νi(1, j + 1, ck) < ν,
and νi(1, j + 2, ck) < ν;
1 − ck − ν + F( j + 1) − F( j), if νi(1, j, ck) < ν, νi(1, j + 1, ck) < ν,
and ν ≤ νi(1, j + 2, ck);
ν − 1 + ck + F( j) − F( j + 1), if νi(1, j, ck) < ν ≤ νi(1, j + 1, ck);
−F( j + 1) + 2F( j) − F( j − 1), if ν ≤ νi(1, j, ck);
≤ 0.
The first and last cases are negative because of convexity of the penalty. The
second and third cases are negative because of the definition of νi(1, j, ck).
When T > 1
assume νi(T, j + 1, ck) > νi(T, j, ck) when νi(T, j, ck) > 0, and Vνi (T, j, ck) is concave
in j when ν > 0 for T = t − 1. We show that these properties are true for T = t.
The difference of the activate and deactivate actions at state (t, j + 1, ck) is
stated as follows.
f ν(t, j + 1, ck)
= ν − 1 + ck + β∑ Pk,k′[Vνi (t − 1, j + 1, ck′) − Vνi (t − 1, j, ck′)]
= ν − 1 + ck + β∑ Pk,k′[Vνi (t − 1, j, ck′) − Vνi (t − 1, j − 1, ck′)]
+β
∑
Pk,k′[Vνi (t − 1, j + 1, ck′) − 2Vνi (t − 1, j, ck′) + Vνi (t − 1, j − 1, ck′]
= f ν(t, j, ck)
+β
∑
Pk,k′[Vνi (t − 1, j + 1, ck′) − 2Vνi (t − 1, j, ck′) + Vνi (t − 1, j − 1, ck′)].
When ν = νi(t, j, ck) > 0, f ν(t, j, ck) = 0 according to the definition of νi(t, j, ck). The
second term in the above equation is negative due to the concavity of the val-
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ue function when ν > 0. Thus f ν(t, j + 1, ck) ≤ 0 when ν = νi(t, j, ck) > 0, which
implies νi(t, j + 1, ck) > νi(t, j, ck).
We have shown the monotonicity of the Whittle’s index when T = t. Next
we show the concavity of the value functions for T = t when ν > 0.
Vνi (t, j + 2, ck) + V
ν
i (t, j, ck) − 2Vνi (t, j + 1, ck)
=

β
∑
Pk,k′Vνi (t − 1, j + 2, ck′) − 2β
∑
Pk,k′Vνi (t − 1, j + 1, ck′) + β
∑
Pk,k′Vνi (t − 1, j, ck′),
if νi(t, j, ck) < ν, νi(t, j + 1, ck) < ν, and νi(t, j + 2, ck) < ν;
1 − ck − ν + β∑ Pk,k′[Vνi (t − 1, j, ck′) − Vνi (t − 1, j + 1, ck′)],
if νi(t, j, ck) < ν, νi(t, j + 1, ck) < ν, and ν ≤ νi(t, j + 2, ck);
ν − (1 − ck) + β∑ Pk,k′[Vνi (t − 1, j + 1, ck′) − Vνi (t − 1, j, ck′)],
if νi(t, j, ck) < ν ≤ νi(t, j + 1, ck);
β
∑
Pk,k′[Vνi (t − 1, j + 1, ck′) − 2Vνi (t − 1, j, ck′) + Vνi (t − 1, j − 1, ck′)],
if ν ≤ νi(t, j, ck);
≤ 0.
The first and fourth terms are less than zero because by the assumption the
value function is concave when ν > 0 for T − 1. The second and third terms are
negative because of the definition of νi(t, j+1, ck). So the value function Vνi (t, j, ck)
is concave in j when ν > 0.
By induction, we have νi(T, j + 1, ck) > νi(T, j, ck) when νi(T, j, ck) > 0, and
Vνi (T, j, ck) is concave in j when ν > 0 for all T . 
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A.4 Proof of Theorem 3
For a Poisson process I[t] with mean µ, we have the expression as follows.
E[I[t]|I[t] > M]Pr(I[t] > M) = µPr(I[t] ≥ M)
For any M > µ − 1, we have the inequality as follows [83].
µPr(I[t] ≥ M) < µPr(I[t] = M)/(1 − µM+1 )
= µM+1e−µ(M + 1)/[(M + 1 − µ)M!]
≤ µM+1eM−µ(M+1)√
2piMM+1/2(M+1−µ)
= O(µe
−µ
√
M
)
(A.5)
where the second inequality is because of Stirling formula. When µ ≤ M/e, the
right hand side decreases to zero, which indicates the asymptotic optimality of
the Whittle’s index.
A.5 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. We have
G(s) −GRMAB(s) , lim supN→∞
[
GN(s) −GNRMAB(s)
]
≤ C1−β limN→∞ E[IN[t]1(IN[t] > M)]
= O(E[I[t]1(I[t] > M)]).
We can rewrite the bound as
E[I[t]1(I[t] > M)]
=
∑
i>M iPr(I[t] = i)
= (M + 1) Pr(I[t] ≥ M + 1) + ∑i=M+2 Pr(I[t] ≥ i).
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• If Pr(I[t] ≥ i) ≤ a exp[−ib/λ], we have
(M + 1) Pr(I[t] ≥ M + 1) + ∑i=M+2 Pr(I[t] ≥ i)
≤ a(M + 1) exp[− (M+1)b
µ
] + a
∑
i=M+2 exp[− ibµ ]
≤ a(M + 1) exp[− (M+1)b
µ
] + a
∫ ∞
M+1
exp(−xb/µ)dx
= a exp[− (M+1)b
µ
][M + 1 + µ/b].
Thus we have
G(s) −GRMAB(s) = O[exp(−Mb
µ
)(Mb + µ)],
which is (3.16) in Theorem 4. When µ = o(M/ lnM), the bound goes to zero
and the Whittle’s index policy is asymptotically optimal.
• If Pr(I[t] ≥ i) ≤ aµ/ib, we have
(M + 1) Pr(I[t] ≥ M + 1) + ∑i=M+2 Pr(I[t] ≥ i)
≤ a µ(M+1)b−1 + aµ
∑
i=M+2 i−b
≤ a µ(M+1)b−1 + aµ
∫ ∞
M+1
x−bdx
= abµ/[(M + 1)b−1(b − 1)].
Thus we have
G(s) −GRMAB(s) = O(µ/Mb−1),
which is (3.17) in Theorem 5. When µ = o(Mb−1), the bound goes to zero
and the Whittle’s index policy is asymptotically optimal.
Thus we have the bound on the gap-to-optimality decreases to zero as stated in
Theorem 4 and 5 . 
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APPENDIX B
APPENDICES FOR CHAPTER 4
Here the proofs under the assumption of the type I extreme value vehicle pref-
erence distribution are presented. The uniform preference distribution proof
can be similarly developed. The subscript j is dropped in this section for con-
venience.
B.1 Proof of Theorem 8
In Theorem 7, the optimal charging price is shown to generate uniform profits
across charging stations. Denote the uniform profit by r , ρ∗i − c¯i, the sum of the
exponential systematic utility by v =
∑NE
i=1 vi =
∑NE
i=1 exp(α1 fi − α2c¯i) and the ratio
of the utility and the exponential profit by κ = v/ exp(α2r). Equation (5.14) can
be rewritten as
g(v, r) , α2β1r(1 − η)(1 − P0) + α2rP0 − 1
= β1 ln(v/κ) C(q0+κ)β1+C
κ
q0+κ
+ ln(v/κ) q0q0+κ − 1
= 0,
(B.1)
where C = e(β1E(UG)−β2pG+βG pE) and q0 = e(α1 f0−α2ρ0).
Note the first term in the left hand side of (B.1), α2β1r(1 − η)(1 − P0), is pos-
itive. We can conclude that as v → +∞, κ → +∞. Otherwise, the second term
ln(v/κ) q0q0+κ → +∞which violates (B.1).
As the sum of exponential systematic utility v increases, the charging service
at the EVCSs is more convenient, thus more consumers tend to purchase EVs
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and prefer to charge at the public charging stations. κ → +∞ gives the conver-
gence of the market share η and P0, which is stated as follows.
Lemma 4.
limv→+∞ η = limv→+∞
(q0+κ)β1
(q0+κ)β1+C
= 1
limv→+∞ P0 = limv→+∞
q0
q0+κ
= 0.
(B.2)
Proof. Since q0 and C are constant, β1 > 0 and κ → +∞, η→ 1 and P0 → 0. 
A direct result of Lemma 4 is that the uniform profit r → +∞ as v → +∞.
Otherwise (B.1) does not hold any more.
By applying the implicit function theorem (IFT) to function g(v, r), we get the
derivative of profit r with respect to the exponential systematic utility v,
∂r
∂v
= −∂g(v, r)/∂v
∂g(v, r)/∂r
=
1
α2v
1
1 + h
, (B.3)
where
h =
β1(1 − η)(1 − P0) + P0
α2β
2
1rη(1 − η)(1 − P0)2 − α2β1r(1 − η)P0(1 − P0) + α2rP0(1 − P0)
.
The numerator of h, β1(1 − η)(1 − P0) + P0, converges to 0 as v→ +∞. Denote
the denominator of h by H. If β1 > 1, H can be rewritten as
H = α2β1r(1 − η)(1 − P0)(1 − P0) + α2rP0(1 − P0)
+α2β1r(1 − η)(1 − P0)[β1η(1 − P0) − 1]
= (1 − P0) + α2β1r(1 − η)(1 − P0)[β1η(1 − P0) − 1],
(B.4)
where the last equality is because of (B.1). In (B.4), the first term converges to 1
and the second term is positive as v→ +∞.
If β1 ≤ 1, H can be rewritten as
H = α2β1r(1 − η)(1 − P0)[β1η(1 − P0) − P0]
+α2rP0[β1η(1 − P0) − P0] + α2rP0[1 − β1η(1 − P0)]
= [β1η(1 − P0) − P0] + α2rP0[1 − β1η(1 − P0)],
(B.5)
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where the last equality is because of (B.1). In (B.5), the first term converges to β1
as v→ +∞ and the second term is positive.
In both cases, H is bounded below from zero as v → +∞. Thus h → 0 and
v ∂r
∂v → 1α2 in (B.3).
By the l’Hoˆpital’s rule, since r → +∞ as v→ +∞,
lim
v→+∞
r
ln v
= lim
v→+∞
∂r/∂v
1/v
= lim
v→+∞
∂2r/∂v2
−v−2 =
1
α2
, (B.6)
which completes the proof.
Note when v > v¯1 for some v¯1 > 0, h > 0. r(v) is strictly increasing in v and
v ∂r
∂v <
1
α2
when v > v¯1 .
B.2 Proof of Theorem 9
First, fixing the number of charging stations to build as NE, we examine where
to build these stations. Denote the sum of exponential systematic utility by
v =
∑NE
i=1 vi and the uniform charging profit by r = ρ
∗
i − c¯i. The unit operational
profit of the investor can be stated as
Π(v)
NcD
= r(v)η(v)
NE∑
i=1
Pi(v) = r(v)
[q0 + κ(v)]β1
[q0 + κ(v)]β1 +C
κ(v)
q0 + κ(v)
, (B.7)
where q0 = exp(α1 f1 − α2ρ0), κ(v) = v exp(−α2r), andC = exp(β1E(UG) − β2pG + βGpE).
The derivative of κ(v) with respect to v is stated as
∂κ(v)
∂v
= exp(−α2r)(1 − α2v∂r
∂v
) (B.8)
which is strictly positive when v > v¯1 according to the discussion in Sec. B.1. So
the operational profit Π(v) is strictly increasing in v when v > v¯1.
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The second order derivative of Π(v) with respect to v is stated as
1
NcD
∂2Π
∂v2 =
η
v2 {v2 ∂
2r
∂v2 (1 − P0)
+(−2rP0)(1 − P0)2
+ 2α2
1
1+h (1 − P0)[(1 − η)β1(1 − P0) + P0]
+r(1 − η)β1(1 − P0)2[β1(1 − 2η − P0) + (2η + 3)P0 − 1]}.
(B.9)
As v → +∞, v2 ∂2r
∂v2 → − 1α2 , η → +∞ and P0 → 0. So when v > v¯2 for some v¯2 > 0,
the first term in (B.9) is negative and bounded above from zero. The second and
last term are negative. The third term is positive but converging to zero. The
second order derivative of Π(v) is negative and we have the concavity of Π(v)
stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 5. Asymptotically, Π(v) is an increasing and concave function of v.
The monotonicity of Π(v) implies that, if given two station candidates k and
k′, fixing the other (NE − 1) stations, the one with larger vi = exp(α1 fi − α2c¯i),
i ∈ {k, k′} should be built because the building costs are the same. So we have
the optimal strategy about where to build stations as follows.
Lemma 6. Fixing the number of stations to build as NE, the asymptotically optimal
strategy of building is to pick NE candidates with largest vi = exp(α1 fi − α2c¯i).
Next, after we sort the NL candidate locations by vi, we can present the cost∑NE
i=1 F (s¯i) = (1 + γ)F0NE as a function of v =
∑NE
i=1 vi. We can treat v as a continu-
ous variable and write F˜(v) , (1 + γ)F0NE as
F˜(v) = (1 + γ)F0N + (v −
N∑
i=1
vi)(1 + γ)F0/vN+1,
if
∑N
i=1 vi < v ≤
∑N+1
i=1 vi. Since vi ≥ vi+1, the cost F˜(v) is a piece wise linear convex
function of v. The partial derivative ∂F˜(v)/∂v is piece wise constant and increas-
ing in v.
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The trends of Π(v), F˜(v) and the derivatives are plotted in Figure B.1 and
Figure B.2. In Figure B.1, v∗ is the optimal point to maximize the profit (Π(v) −
F˜(v)). Figure B.2 shows the derivative of F˜(v) is increasing and the marginal
profit ∂Π(v)
∂v is decreasing when v is large enough. The last cross point of the
derivatives of Π(v) and F˜(v) is the optimal point. Combining Lemma 5 and 6,
we have the asymptotic optimality.
Figure B.1: Profit and cost of charging stations.
B.3 Proof of Theorem 10
Denote the sum of consumer utility and investor’s operational profit by S¯W(v) =
λNCSC(v) + Π(v), the social planner is maximizing (S¯W(v) − F˜(v)).
The consumer utility, SC(v), can be rewritten as a function of the total expo-
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Figure B.2: Profit and cost derivatives of charging stations.
nential systematic utility v as follows.
SC(v) = ln
[(
q0 + v exp(−α2r)
)β1
C1 +C2
]
,
which is increasing in v. So
∂S¯W(v)
∂v
= λNC
∂SC(v)
∂v
+
∂Π(v)
∂v
>
∂Π(v)
∂v
.
We plot the derivative of the social welfare as well as that of the investor utility
in Fig B.3. The optimal social welfare point v∗∗ is also the cross point of ∂F˜(v)
∂v
and ∂S¯W (v)
∂v . Since
∂S¯W (v)
∂v >
∂Π(v)
∂v , it is always true that v
∗∗ ≥ v∗, which implies
the socially optimal solution requires more charging stations than the private
market outcomes.
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Figure B.3: Derivatives of social welfare and investor utility.
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